Do Fast Moving Markets require Fast (and Furious) Competition Authorities?
In support of his aggressive move against Google on 25 May 2012, Commissioner Almunia declared:
“I believe that these fast-moving markets would particularly benefit from a quick resolution of the competition issues identified. Restoring competition swiftly to the benefit of users at an early stage is always preferable to lengthy proceedings, although these sometimes become indispensable to competition enforcement“.
Later in June, he again said:
“I strongly believe that users and competitors would greatly benefit from a quick resolution of the case; it is always better to restore competition swiftly in fast-moving markets, provided of course that the companies concerned are ready to seriously address and solve the problems at stake“.
Commissioner Almunia, and his advisers, must have read Judge R. Posner who warned 10 years ago that:
“Antitrust litigation moves very slowly relative to the new economy. Law time is not real time. The law is committed to principles of due process that limit the scope for summary proceedings, and the fact that litigation is conducted by lawyers before tribunals that are not technically trained or experienced inevitably slows the process.
The mismatch between law time and new-economy real time is troubling in two respects. First, an antitrust case involving a new-economy firm may drag on for so long relative to the changing conditions of the industry as to become irrelevant, ineffectual. That was a problem even in the old economy. One recalls for example that by the time the monopolization case against Alcoa completed its journey through the courts, Alcoa had lost its monopoly for reasons unrelated to the litigation; as a result, the decree finally entered against Alcoa offered little more than nominal relief (the divestiture of Alcoa’s Canadian subsidiary). This type of problem is likely to be more frequent in the new economy.
Second, even if the case is not obsoleted by passage of time, its pendency may cast a pall over parties to and affected by the litigation, making investment riskier and complicating business planning“.
Does this call for novel enforcement tactics, with increased recourse to settlements and interim measures?
Or, in evidentiary words, does this require doing away with “cogent evidence” in exchange for “serious doubts“? I have my own doubts.
And Posner too. As he, very humbly, recognizes: “This problem will be extremely difficult to solve; indeed, I cannot even glimpse the solution“.
If God Posner cannot find it, we are indeed all doomed.