Comments for Chillin'Competition

Comment on AT Quote of the Day by Hana

Hana — Wed, 22 Feb 2012 09:44:48 +0000

Thank you! i am currently writing my master thesis on this! perfect quote to start my 3rd chapter!!! Merci!

Comment on The Friday Slot (5) – Jean-François Bellis by Michael

Michael — Mon, 20 Feb 2012 15:47:45 +0000

Great interview!

Comment on Anthem by Nicolas Petit

Nicolas Petit — Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:23:43 +0000

Martin, I’m not sure I see your point.
On your second remark, an interesting use of Franglish by the Commission

Comment on Anthem by Lauras

Lauras — Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:29:29 +0000

It was Lithuanian (not Latvian) court

Comment on Anthem by Martin Holterman

Martin Holterman — Thu, 16 Feb 2012 16:41:36 +0000

I’m not sure that I see the problem. As far as I can tell from a quick scan, it’s a straightforward exercise in “object or effect”.

More fascinatingly, why is this document partly in French and partly in English? Was it a collaboration between the legal service and DG Comp, or did someone simply go overboard with their multilingualism?

Comment on The Friday Slot (4) – Richard Whish by Valentin Mircea

Valentin Mircea — Tue, 14 Feb 2012 19:56:21 +0000

I would agree with Professor Whish on TeliaSonera (margin squeeze is important for the market equilibrium) and also with his commnents on refusal to deal and on the rebates. Does this make me a yes-man ??

Comment on Antitrust Writing Awards by Nicolas Petit

Nicolas Petit — Thu, 09 Feb 2012 09:17:50 +0000

Yes we can!

Comment on On how to unconditionally clear a monopoly in Phase I by ParisLawyer

ParisLawyer — Wed, 08 Feb 2012 19:03:59 +0000

I think previous comments have indirectly pointed out at the crux of the problem. Perhaps it was missed because Nicolas and Alfonso only referred to the horizontal effects of the Transaction.
The way I see it, these horizontal effects cannot be seen in isolation. The big problem about this case lies on Microsoft’s incentives to use its monopoly in the market for consumer services to obtain profits in the market for enterprise services (I disagree with the comment above that the Commission should not look at monetization strategies). That is a very profitable market where Microsoft is also active. If Microsoft is the only company offering the ability to connect companies with consumers, companies would all tend to choose Microsoft´s products.
In a way, you could also argue that there is a sort of “two-sided” relationships between consumers and enterprise services (the more consumers you can access, the more companies will purchase your services). To my mind, you could examine this situation in a very similar way to the “vertical cross-market effect” theory to which the Commission resorted in the Travelport/Worldspan decision (http://www.concurrences.com/article_revue_web.php3?id_article=15338&lang=en)

I agree with the comments saying that the merger should have been cleared at some point. But in light of recent similar cases (think of Intel/McAfee or Cisco/Tandegeberg) it’s weird that the Commission did not subject its approval to interoperability remedies.

Comment on Students’ Bests by Alfonso Lamadrid

Alfonso Lamadrid — Tue, 07 Feb 2012 10:13:18 +0000

Sure you are the culprit; What kind of question was that??

Comment on The Friday Slot (4) – Richard Whish by Damien

Damien — Sat, 04 Feb 2012 22:46:54 +0000

Correction, I meant written by the ECJ. I don’t see why the conditions contained in Bronner for a refusal to supply infringement should not be met in a margin squeeze case. Margin squeeze is nothing but a constructive refusal to supply.