HOW EFFECTIVE IS JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EU COMPETITION LAW? A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN EU AND ITALIAN COMPETITION LAW

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How are our Judges doing, Psychologically-Wise?







Purpose of the Presentation

- 3
- Is judicial review effective in competition cases? => unsettled issue in European scholarship
- Need to go beyond the abstract, conventional discussion of the standard of judicial review
- Need for an empirical, performance-based assessment of the GC's judicial scrutiny over Commission in competition cases

Outline



- 1. The functions of judicial review
- 2. Quantitative assessment
- 3. Conclusion

The Functions of Judicial Review

Typology of the Functions of Judicial Review

- The Lawyer's Standpoint => Safeguarding Universal Values
 - Fundamental procedural rights
 - O Dworkin's "Forum of principles"
- The Economist's Standpoint => Promoting Welfare
 - Eradicate decisional errors
 - ➤ Shavell's 100% annulment rate prophecy
 - ➤ Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla => in particular, Type I errors
- The Political Scientist's Standpoint => Ensuring Accountability
 - Principal-Agent theory
 - Ex post correction device
- Other Functions

2. Quantitative Assessment

2. Quantitative Assessment

8

Methodology

O Data-set of more than 200 decisions

Table I – Overview of the Dataset									
Provision	Article 101		Article 102			EUMR			
Source	Total	Orders	Judgments	Total	Orders	Judgments	Total	Orders	Judgments
Total	148	18	130	3 9	7	32	30	8	22

- State-aid decisions excluded
- Accountability function of judicial review untested, as this would require an investigation of the consequences of the caselaw at the Commission's level
 - **▼** But internal re-organisation of DG COMP in 2004
 - × Adoption of internal checks and balances

2.1. Performance of the GC in relation to the Safeguarding of Fundamental Principles

- Participation of stakeholders
- Protecting fundamental rights
 - References to Instruments protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
 - References to General Principles of EU Law (including Competition Law)

Conclusion

- o GC's review is effective in so far as the right-based function is concerned
- But this is not the GC's primary function

10

- Eradication of decisional errors can be quantitatively measured
 - Shavell's assumption => rational applicants only challenge unlawful decisions
 - 100% annulment rate is unrealistic, but useful
 - O Data is difficult to interpret under Article 101 and EUMR
 - Data is troubling under Article 102 TFEU => GC never annulled in full a Commission decision / all cases involve partial annulments on peripheral issues



Table IX – Number of Annulment Judgments on Incompatibility/Infringement Decisions						
Provision	EUMR	Article 101	Article 102			
	4/7	31/ 117	4/14			
Total	(57.1%)	(26.5%)	(partial: 4)			
	(full:4)	(partial: 23)	(full: 0)			
		(full: 8)				

Table X – Number and Rate of Revised Fines on article 261 Applications					
(on fines grounds only)					
Provision	Article 101	Article 102			
Total	38/87 (43.7%)	2/11 (18.2%)			

- Hypothesis 1 Commission Always Right?
 - o Implausible success story as errors are part of human nature
 - Benchmarking
 - In other areas where standard is possibly lower (EUMR), and negative decisions are less frequent, rate of annulment is higher
 - x In other areas where standard is equal, rate of judgment higher
 - Applicants still lodge Article 102 TFEU proceedings (belief that decisions are flawed is strong)

- 13
- Hypothesis 2 Judicial immunity through formalistic normative standards
- Quantitative assessment
 - Proxy 1: Degree of reliance of old, forms-based precedents => most cited cases are *Hoffmann La Roche* and *Michelin II*
 - Proxy 2: Presence of mainstream economic concepts in Article
 102 TFEU Judgments
 - "Consumer welfare" not even cited once

Table XII – Mainstream Economic Concepts in Article 102 TFEU Judgments		
Market power	7/30 (23.3%)	
Collusion	3/30 (10%)	
Economies of scale (economy of scale)	8/30 (26.7%)	
Oligopoly	5/30 (16.7%)	
Allocative efficiency	0/30 (0%)	
Profit-maximization	2/30 (6.7%)	
Consumer welfare	0/30 (0%)	
Elasticity (of demand)	2/30 (6.7%)	
Efficiency	12/30 (40%)	
Market failure	1/30 (3.3%)	
Rent	0/30 (0%)	
Transaction cost(s)	0/30 (0%)	
Opportunity cost(s)	1/30 (3.3%)	
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI)	1/30 (3.3%)	
SSNIP test	0/30 (0%)	

3. Conclusion

3.1. Schizophrenic Judicial Review?



Judicial Activism

v. Judicial Conservatism

- Article 101 TFEU and EUMR
 - Stringent Review of Commission Decisions
 - Reversal of long-lasting legal standards
 - ★ EUMR => Airtours v.

 Commission, T-342/99

- Article 102 TFEU
 - Deferent review of Commission Decisions
 - Permanence of normative legal standards

3.2. Article 102 TFEU Cases



- In abuse of dominance cases, however, heavy reliance on old, formalistic normative standards which fare poorly with basic economic concepts, and even with common sense (Tomra v. Commission, T-155/06)
- The Courts conservatism has ordo-liberalist roots => « big is bad » philosophy enshrined in the Treaty
- Now let's be serious: the competition rules are not sacred, intangible provisions (increasingly less with the relegation of Article 3(1)g)
- They're a component of economic policy, which ought to be subject to adjustments/optimization over time and with advances in knowledge
- + they are very terse, and their content needs to be clarified
- Generalized risk of type I errors + chilling effect on attempts to modernise competition regimes accross the EU

3.3. A Piece of Advice to the GC

18

 Why not use the Guidance Communication on Exclusionary Abuses? => a safe and sound, framework, which resorts to basic, but consensual common sense concepts