Chillin'Competition

I have uploaded on ssrn a new paper (see here) a paper that discusses the judgment of the Court of Justice in Android Auto as well as its substantive and institutional implications. I am pleased that the paper received yesterday the AdC Competition Policy Award, organised every year by the Portuguese Competition Authority.

The way in which Android Auto has changed the law of refusal to deal, it seems to me, may not have been fully appreciated. To make this point, it is sufficient to apply the Court’s reasoning in Android Auto to the facts at stake in Bronner. The latter would have been decided differently; evidence of indispensability would not have been required to establish an abuse.

As I explain in the paper, this difference is a function of the way in which Android Auto (re)interprets the indispensability condition. In Bronner and Magill, whether or not the dominant firm had kept the assets ‘for the needs of its own business‘ was assessed by reference to the relevant market concerned by the refusal. It was therefore irrelevant that the TV channels in Magill were licensing their copyright to newspapers (but not weekly magazines) or that Mediaprint was printing and distributing another publication in Bronner at the time of the facts.

The analytical approach followed in Android Auto construes the indispensability condition differently. According to the new doctrine, where the dominant firm is dealing with a third party in market A, it can no longer invoke indispensability in relation to a refusal concerning market B. For the same reason, the judgment has significantly reduced the scope of the refusal to deal case law.

This transformation has obvious implications for digital markets. Dominant players in these markets often run systems that are partially open and partially closed. This said, the criteria followed by the Court suggest that the ruling is likely to have an impact in other industries and markets.

In any event, the implications of the judgment go beyond the shrinking of the refusal to deal doctrines. Android Auto allows for intervention that is not confined to a mere duty to deal. A dominant firm may indeed be required not just to share an input or infrastructure with third parties, but to redesign its assets by taking into account the demands of the said third parties. In this sense, the operation of the infrastructure becomes a cooperative venture.

I look forward to your comments on the paper. And thanks again to the AdC!

LSE Law School is looking for an Assistant Professor of Competition Law, to join the Faculty in September 2026. All information in terms of requirements, conditions and on how to apply can be found here: https://www.jobs.ac.uk/job/DOZ822/assistant-professor-in-law-competition-law.

Needless to say, the competition law team could not be more excited about the prospect of enhancing our teaching and research capabilities in the field.

I can tell from experience that LSE Law School is a non-hierarchical environment that allows you to flourish and find your voice as a scholar. Teaching and administrative duties are light in the first few years (up until promotion to an Associate Professorship). In addition, you will benefit from an annual (and generous) research allowance.

You may be asked to contribute to teaching in foundational subjects, but our competition law curriculum is large and varied. In addition to a dedicated undergraduate module, the LSE Law School now offers an LLM programme with an ample array of competition law options, ranging from State aid and subsidies to the regulation of competition in digital markets.

If you are interested in applying and would like to have an informal chat about the post, do not hesitate to get in touch with me.

With every new academic year comes a new edition of the mardis du droit de la concurrence, This series has been around pretty muchsince the dawn of European competition law. It continues to be a unique venue to get a sense of the evolution and direction of travel of our field, more recently under the expert leadership of Denis Waelbroeck and Jean-François Bellis (now joined by the great Nathan Cambien).

The programme for the new academic year is now out (see here). It includes talks that have become classic fixtures, such as Fernando Castillo de la Torre‘s overview of the case law in the area of cartels and provides a complete tour d’horizon of all areas of enforcement, featuring both Commission officials and private practitioners.

Advocate General Laila Medina will be closing this year’s series with a *lundi du droit* (11th May 2026) with a speech on ‘EU competition law and the Court of Justice‘.

I am honoured (and grateful) to have been invited to open this year’s series on Tuesday 4th November (7pm Brussels time) with a discussion on the recent developments on abuse of dominance. More info on can be found on the flyer above. I really look forward to seeing many of you there!