Archive for the ‘Antitrust Scholarship’ Category
New paper on ssrn
Here’s a link to a new paper which I just finalized with my good friend David Henry (Howrey). The paper will appear in the book on vertical restraints that I am currently editing with Charles Gheur, as a follow up to our conference last year.
Its main added value is, I believe, to offer a stepwise method to self-assess vertical agreements. Beyond this, the paper offers a few critical perspectives on selected issues. It contends in particular that (i) the double market share threshold is certainly a nice idea on paper, but that it does not pass the practicability test, especially for small firms involved in vertical agreeements; (ii) the new framework marks a clear extension of the scope of EU competition law, in particular because it turns buyer power upside down (from a pro-competitive factor to an anticompetitive one).
Finally, I cannot resist to share a moment of happiness with you. I learned today that Anne Perrot and Jean-François Bellis will use my paper on the effects based approach under Article 102 TFEU as suggested reading for their forthcoming BSC module.
Market Definition Teasers
Following Alberto Alemano’s comment a few days ago, I’d like to ask our readers to share possible ” market definition teasers“.
The concept covers funny AND intricate market definition examples. In other words, market definition illustrations which can be used with students approaching the issue for the first time.
Here are mine, centered on products placed on relevant markets with possibly fluctuating borders :
- Coca-Cola & Pepsi & other drinks
- Eurostar & Ferry & Airlines
- Personal computers & Macs
- Branded fragances v. non branded fragances
- iPhones & other mobile phones
- Inux & Windows
- Theatrical movie distribution & DVD rental distribution
- CD-recorded music & digital music files
- Low costs carriers & flag carriers
PS: The picture above is taken from Puggy’s latest album. This LP – which includes a song entitled teaser – is terrific.
Gerber goes Global
Back in the day, D. Gerber (University of Chicago) made a great job at describing the historical roots of the EU competition system and its inner theoritical logics.
More than ten years after, his book is still available for 265$ on Amazon.
If Gerber’s new piece is as influential as the first, it will surely win whatever competition prize exists and, very importantly, collect huge royalties.
See flyer hereafter: OUP UK Flyer 2010 (2)
Chillingcompetition received no copy, but others apparently did and made a good review.
New Paper on SSRN
Damien Geradin and myself have just posted a new paper on ssrn. This paper is work in progress. It is entitled “Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment“. The paper tries to be a little innovative, in providing an empirical assessment (numbers and stats) on judicial review. As usual, comments are most welcome.
For regular users of ssrn, please note that hardcopies of papers posted on ssrn.com will soon be made available, and will cost a little less than 10$.
Patent = Monopoly
Many antitrust cholars are reluctant to equate an IPR with a monopoly. This is because, under conditions of equal access to capital and investments, any firm can also benefit from the protection of IPRs, and challenge the monopoly holder with innovative, IPRed products/services.
Our supreme judges in Luxembourg seem however to be a little less cautious. At para 64 of C-468/06 to C‑478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, [2008] ECR I-7139, the Court of Justice held that:
“a medicine is protected by a patent which confers a temporary monopoly on its holder, the price competition which may exist between a producer and its distributors, or between parallel traders and national distributors, is, until the expiry of that patent, the only form of competition which can be envisaged“.
This wording is unfortunate. The Court seems unaware of the fact that within a same relevant market, there can be competition amongst various patented products.
(Image possibly subject to copyrights: source here)
Cost(e)s
Two important clarifications:
- In reading students dissertations, i keep being confronted with the erroneous view that a sunk cost is almost necessarily a fixed cost. This is simply untrue: when firms hire additional staff to increase their production scale, they incur training investments, which are sunk, variable costs.
- Also, students apparently fail to understand why marginal costs typically increase. This is because contrary to what is often said, firms face in the long term decreasing returns: diminishing productivity, costly access to input when quantities purchased increase, etc. (also, in the long run, additional fixed costs must be incurred)
(Image possibly subject to copyrights: source here)
Subversive Readings?
In reaction to one of my recent papers, a very good friend said that I was a “neo-chicagoan” (friends can be tough…).
This morning, I came accross a masterpiece of NON-chicagoan scholarship (L. Kaplow, “Antitrust, Law & Economics and the Courts”, (1987) Vol. 50, 4, Law and Contemporary Problems, 181). I thought I should share with you several powerful quotes, with which I fully concur.
“The price theory widely hailed by the Chicago School as its heart and soul, although a useful starting point, is in fact the earliest and simplest for of economic analysis of industry” p.189
“Antitrust law is necessarily based on the contrary assumption that courts at times can punish detrimental practices better than markets will” P.192
“One of the most widely noted shortcomings of Chicago School antitrust analysis is that it uses static models even when examining effects that are intrinsically dynamic – as in the case of all exclusionary practices …” P.192
“[a]ll calls for the rule of reason should be understood as either intentionally or unconsciously disguised attempts to remove the area from antitrust scrutiny” P.196 (I am not sure I 100% agree with this one though)
(Image possibly to copyrights: source here)
Testing your competition knowledge
Who said that the dual, bifurcated structure of Article 101 was the “original sin” of EU competition law?
Joke
Apologies to all my friends at the Commission who read this blog, but I thought this was just a good one:
“What is the difference with Terrorists and European Fonctionnaires?, Well with Terrorists at least you can negotiate”
A noteworthy precision: it is taken from a blog written by a Commission official.
(Image subject to copyrights: source here)
Teaser
Want to know why the EU’s commitment to fostering parallel trade is plain ideology?
Want to know why the Commission’s decisions in MSFT make no sense from an IO perspective, but are sound from a behavioralist standpoint.
Then read my new working papers here and here.
(Image possibly subject to copyrights: source here)
Chillin'Competition 
