Chillin'Competition

As Alfonso hinted in a previous post, I will be an “atypical” trainee at DG COMP in the next 6 months. 

The stage starts tomorrow, and whilst I keep my ULg, GCLC and BSC activities, I have decided to discontinue my posts on the blog during my stay at COMP.

Alfonso will of course remain active. And I’ll be back in full force in 6 months.

Meanwhile, you can still write to me at my usual university address.

This post also gives me a last opportunity to share with you several recent presentations and papers:

• A presentation on injunctions on SEPS given at the University of Wurzburg (Germany), in the context of a seminar series organized by Professor Florian Bien: Universität Wurtzburg – Presentation on Injunctions
• A presentation on Compliance Programmes in EU and National Competition Law, given in Paris at a joint EDHEC-Ernst&Young conference: Antitrust et compliance – 11 02 14 – Risque juridique et compliance – tendances actuelles NP
• A paper on the flawed patent=monopoly equation (co-authored with Prof. Bostyn): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373471
• A paper on market power in the credit rating industry (co-authored with Profs Candelon and Gautier): http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392989

With Alfonso, you guys are in good hands.

And my posts will presumably be better informed when I return in 6 months.

I attach hereafter a link to the presentation on Article 102 TFEU that I gave yesterday at the Mardis du droit de la concurrence.

I end up concluding that time is ripe for Communication on Article 9 (or a notice, or guidelines, or a guidance, or whatever a little formal).

But more importantly, I make substantive suggestions to modify the Article 9 tool (eg. to introduce a bifurcation within Article 9 for protracted infringements, etc.).

Commissioner Almunia has been described in the press as “Mr. Commitments”.

I believe that he would really leave office on a high note with the adoption of a Communication rationalising and codifying the practice of COMP in this controversial, and often misunderstood, area.

Présentation N PETIT – Mardi du droit de la concurrence – Article 102 TFUE

This WE, I’ll be prepping for the Mardis du droit de la concurrence held at the Free University of Brussels (ULB) next Tuesday. The talk is about recent developments in the law of Article 102 TFEU (read in the last year). This is the propaganda bit of this post.

On substance, not much to report I am afraid. Pity that Intel is still stuck in the judicial pipeline.

So I thought of saying a few words on institutional developments. I’ll make the usual point on Article 9 commitments (and the less usual one that time is ripe for a communication on this, simply to clear away some ambiguities of R1/2003 and streamline the process). I’ll talk also of the // proceedings between CJEU and Commission in the ongoing smartphones war (with its recent article 15 addition) .

But there’s one thing I would like to do above all: question whether the Commission is sufficiently staffed to handle the flood of complaints that have been lodged before it, and in particular, before Unit C/3, Antitrust, IT, Internet and Consumer electronics. For this, I’d need more specific info on the number of formal complaints lodged. But despite the wealth of info available on COMP’s website, there’s no registry of formal complaints :(.

I have already asked this information to the official in charge, but they are understandably not able to disclose it.

So I today turn to you: could you help me re-compile the list of formal cases/complaints currently lodged before unit C/3? You can post this info as comment to this post or email me at nicolas.petit@ulg.ac.be

I also buy info on “ghost cases”, ie forgotten cases that are no longer on the radar screen of external observers: Dupont/Honeywell, Mathworks, Wikileaks, spare part cases etc.

And finally, I am a taker of any information of cases which have been relegated to the low end of the priority list of this Commission.

Besides this, I’ll submit that substantive law developments yield institutional effects. In my opinion, but this is my opinion only, the forms-based approach is in part responsible for the flurry of – weak – complaints that have been brought before COMP.

It is so elastic that it offers ammunition for ludicrous grievances. Yet another reason to embrace fully the economic approach of Article 102 TFEU.

PS: I Article 9-commit to negotiate a free ticket for those who help.

A new paper, this time with co-written with an IP specialist, Prof. Sven Bostyn (University of Liverpool).

We take a shot at the flawed patent=monopoly equation.

Here’s the abstract:

“A patent right is an exclusionary right. With it, the patent holder can exclude third parties from making, using, selling, etc. products or processes protected by his patent. In the past, this right has also been referred to as a ‘monopoly right’ and this has lead to considerable confusion about the scope of patent rights and the role of the patent system in a modern economy. This paper seeks to provide some clarity on this issue and highlight the distinction between the exclusionary right granted by patent law and the notion of monopoly in economic regulation“.

European Merger Remedies

Law and Policy

By Dorte Hoeg

As merger transactions become more complex, so do the remedies involved. This book seeks to identify and examine the most important aspects of merger remedies, which have emerged and evolved in the European Commission’s policy and practice over the past 20 years. The in-depth analysis of applicable provisions and guidelines is structured in accordance with a typical ‘remedies lifecycle’: the negotiation, submission, assessment, adoption, implementation and enforcement of remedies. Furthermore, numerous conditional clearance decisions and judgments as well as studies and legal literature on the subject are described and put into a coherent analytical framework with the aim of providing as much nuance as possible in the evaluation of the Commission’s past and present remedies policy and practice.

While the Commission indisputably has accomplished numerous successes in its remedies enforcement over the years, it has also encountered some significant obstacles and shortcomings along the way. To this effect, the final chapter in the book critically assesses whether the current framework, which has remained unchanged since 2008, continues to provide an adequate regulatory response to today’s remedies issues and challenges. Where adjustments and improvements are deemed desirable or necessary, possible measures are considered.

Dorte Hoeg recently obtained her Doctor of Philosophy from King’s College London based on a thesis on EU merger remedies. She is a former national expert and case-handler at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition and has also previously worked for the Danish Competition Authority, including representing the authority in the EU’s Advisory Committee on Concentrations.

December 2013   288pp     Hardback     9781849464116     RSP: £65 / €85

20% Discount Price: £52 / €68 (+ Postage and Packing)

Order Online

http://www.hartpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?ISBN=9781849464116

If you would like to place an order you can do so through the Hart Publishing website (link above). To receive the discount please type the reference ‘CCB’ in the voucher code field and click ‘apply’.

Hart Publishing Ltd, 16C Worcester Place, Oxford, OX1 2JW

Telephone Number: 01865 517 530

Fax Number: 01865 510 710

Website: http://www.hartpub.co.uk

Note to readers: this will be controversial. 

Disclaimer: the content of this post represents my sole opinion only, and does not reflect the official views of this blog or of Alfonso Lamadrid (who likes to be more politically correct than myself)

Lawyers arguing in Luxemburg are p*****g off the Members of the Court.

Mistress AG Sharpston made this very clear in a recent editorial in the Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2013) 4 (6): 453-454:

“Finally, you the reader of this editorial—the advocate pleading competition cases before the EU courts, or the in-house adviser analysing the merits of challenging a Commission decision or lodging an appeal—can also make a major contribution towards ensuring that the courts function effectively and smoothly and can deliver effective judicial review. Please (I beg you) consolidate your arguments and only run with the points that have some real substance to them. Don’t put in an application with six grounds of appeal, each divided into several sub-points (you know, and I know, that not all are of equal merit!). Please plead succinctly and clearly (think of translation!) and please don’t throw in an additional 600 pages of annexes in case something there might help to swing the case your way. And, by the way: please don’t appeal a clearly hopeless case to the Court of Justice just to show the client that you’ve tried everything you can. We too are worried about our workload—particularly the part of that workload that consists of wholly unmeritorious or manifestly inadmissible appeals—and we are looking at ways to streamline how we deal with such cases. You have been warned. Ensuring effective judicial protection against the background of increasing workload and financial constraints is a real challenge. It can be achieved; but everyone needs to play their part“.

You read well: you have been warned.

Now, how bout’ the sanction? After all, the rethorics of fear cannot work effectively, if not accompanied by subsequent implementation (for more evidence, see the recent purge in North Korea). In the antitrust field, our friend Wouter Wils would say that enforcement cannot be optimal without a credible (probable) sanction.

With notable exceptions (CISAC), judgments like Dole, Tomra or Telefonica say it all.

Most of the applicant’s arguments are purged swept aside, without being subject to the simplest discussion.

Now who’s the culprit?

• A milky business-model based on billable hours, information asymetries and moral hazard between principal (client) and agent (lawyer)?

or

• A political judicial institution of non specialist judges, who exhibit interest for principled issues only and a correlative sense of contempt disinterest for factual and technical issues?

PS: Not everyone in Luxembourg seems to side with the official party line AG Sharpston. In his opinion under Telefonica, AG Whatelet also complained of overlenghty submissions. Yet, he reviewed the parties’ arguments. See hereafter.

“7. Force est de constater que: i) le pourvoi, formulé de façon confuse et peu structurée, est extrêmement long – la traduction française de la requête ne comptant pas moins de 133 pages, et ce en interligne simple, pour 492 points (8) – et répétitif, en présentant plusieurs centaines de moyens, branches, griefs, arguments et éléments d’arguments (ce qui constituerait, selon la Commission, un record dans l’histoire contentieuse de l’Union); ii) le pourvoi vise presque systématiquement à obtenir un nouvel examen des faits, sous le couvert d’allégations selon lesquelles le Tribunal aurait appliqué un «critère juridique erroné»; iii) les moyens sont souvent présentés comme de simples affirmations dénuées de toute motivation, et iv) les requérantes, d’une part, critiquent souvent la décision litigieuse et non l’arrêt attaqué et, d’autre part, lorsque leurs critiques s’adressent effectivement à l’arrêt attaqué, elles n’identifient pratiquement jamais les passages ou les points précis de cet arrêt qui contiendraient de prétendues erreurs de droit.

8. Ces constatations et la difficulté, voire l’impossibilité, pour la Commission d’exercer ses droits de la défense ont inspiré l’exception d’irrecevabilité qu’elle a soulevée à l’encontre de l’ensemble du pourvoi. Même si je peux avoir quelque sympathie pour cette exception d’irrecevabilité – et d’ailleurs de nombreuses parties du pourvoi me paraissent manifestement irrecevables – il n’en demeure pas moins que le pourvoi en tant que tel ne peut être déclaré irrecevable dans son intégralité, dans la mesure où quelques-uns des moyens ou arguments du pourvoi (même si c’est à l’aune d’aiguilles dans une botte de foin) remplissent les exigences de recevabilité. Ces aiguilles soulèvent en outre des questions de principe, parfois inédites, concernant notamment l’obligation du Tribunal d’exercer un véritable contrôle de pleine juridiction”.