Archive for the ‘Breaking – Antitrust – News’ Category
The Endive Brainstorming Room
Yesterday we said we were surprised by the number of people who had suggested us to comment on the fine imposed on French endive growers. Our post on this issue has given rise to very profound competition law related thoughts.
This is why we have created The Endive Brainstorming Room.
In addition to Hans Zenger’s brilliant comment on endives and Giffen goods (see the comments to yesterday’s post), over the past few hours several people have conveyed to us their views on endives:
– Well-known Commission official:
“I think the typically insightful analysis on your blog of the endives cartel has left a couple of important questions unanswered:
First, given that endives figured large on the menu at Garenmarkt a full 20 years ago, I think we should be looking at the possible 102 aspects and not only the 101. There’s clearly some durable market power at work here. The only plausible explanation of this continuing position of dominance must be exclusionary conduct as against those vegetables that are not utterly unpleasant.
Second, I think this cuts to the heart of the consumer welfare problem in antitrust. Surely consumer welfare is enhanced by endives being priced at as high a possible level, thereby reducing demand? Is the cartel therefore not welfare enhancing?”
– Raymond Radiguet:
“Alfonso and Nicolas use this blog to promote vegetables other than endives, which is fine with me. However, the claim that no one likes endives is so obvious that it is simply hilarious“.
– Current students at the College of Europe:
One student says “there is a maverick around here: last week (during dinner on Wednesday 29) a law professor was heard stating “I like endives; it’s a pity that they are not as bitter as they used to be”. “Seed selection should be blamed for this”, he added.
Another student tells us that in reality endives are not dominant: “at most, they are part of a duopoly; I would argue that endives and frites are collectively dominant“.
A third ELEA student commented that ” ‘Roulade de jambon avec endives’ sounds good but tastes horrible“.
– The anonymous lawyer who has found the solution to the debt crisis:
First email: “Great post! So the French are enforcing competition law in the agricultural sector. Cripes – whatever next?! Will DG COMP pay OPEC a visit in Vienna??
Second email (2 minutes later): “Thinking about it, that would be a way to solve Europe’s debt problem – fine all OPEC countries 10% of their turnover! This is brilliant! I’ve found the solution to the crisis!!!!”
If you have any additional reflections on the relationship between endives and competition law/economics that you just can’t keep for yourself, please share them with us.
Reactions to the endives cartel

The French Autorité de la Concurrence has imposed a fine of 3,6 million euros on four French endive growers for their participation in an endive cartel.
The news has attracted the interest of our readers, who have sent us several emails suggesting a post on this story. The interest of our readers on endives has matched that raised in the past by the Dutch investigation on erotic toys and costumes. Weird.
The news has spurred interesting reactions from some experts. “This case proves that what competition law/economics considers in the interests of consumer welfare (low prices, lots of endives) does not necessarily equate to what society (or the students at the College of Europe in Bruges) would consider consumer welfare!”, says Grace Aylward.
Some background: Grace studied as the same time as me in Bruges, and we both share the suspicion that all of the French and Belgian stocks of endives are regularly served to the students at the College of Europe. There is no other plausible explanation as to why endives featured in the menu every other day.
Consulted about this phenomenon, Napoleón Ruiz (who also claims to have been affected by overfeeding of endives in Bruges) said to Chillin’Competition that “the decision of the Autorité de la Concurrence will have the effect of enhancing the dominant position of endives at the menu of the College’s canteen“.
“They are disgusting; I can’t stand them” said Mark English.
Mr. English directed us to another competition lawyer Alex Papanikolaou (“ask Alex; he was a real canteen presence”, he said). Mr Papanikolaou seems to share the opinion of his peer: “Hard to believe people would buy and consume these things at any price, let alone at cartelized prices“, he says.
A legal director at a high-tech company who requested anonimity said “they are as bitter as the country where they’re grown. Anyone buying them deserves the overprice”.
A partner at a Spanish firm says “the Bundeskartellamt should imitate the French Authority and investigate manouvres by German growers of cucumber to impede imports of Spanish cucumber. Why focus on endives when you have cucumbers?”
Please comment on this post if you also have an strong opinion on this investigation.
P.S. For further information on endives click here. For the role of Belgian endives in US politics click here (I’m not joking; and I bet this is the link that you’ll click the most). For recipees featuring endives, click here.
Yet another well-timed complaint against Google

It has been reported by Reuters that Microsoft and other companies are behind a new complaint against Google before the European Commission. Microsoft has denied having lodged any formal complaint. Regardless of whether Microsoft is involved or not, the news raises some thoughts:
Timing:
Once again, this complaint seems to have been strategically timed. Rumor had it that the European Commission would be adopting a preliminary position on the ongoing investigation by mid-March. No matter the merits of the complaint, whoever is behind it deserves credit for outstanding timing; they know how to play the game.
It reminds me of a well-known scene of my favorite movie saga, when in The Godfather III (yes, my taste for movies is absolutely mainstream) Al Pacino screams “Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in!” (doesn’t he look a bit like Sarkozy in the pic above?) (it also brings to mind the “Yet another on-time flight from Ryanair” pre-recorded phrase that follows that “sweet” melody that you get when you land..).
In our previous posts on this pending case we have always highlighted the good timing of complainants (see here). Also, last April Nicolas wrote here that the “chief, and maybe sole merit [of Microsoft`s complaint] is to throw some mud at Google in the press, at a moment when (i) Google has been reported to be close to a settlement with the Commission; and (ii) Google has suffered a major setback last week, when its settlement with US publishers and authors was annulled by a NY judge” (this opinion by Nicolas was also reported in the press).This time, the complaint not only comes a few days before the Commission is expected either to drop the case or send an Statement of Objections. It also comes a few days after Microsoft lodged another complaint against Motorola (only a week after the Commission and the DOJ gave green light to its acquisition by Google). Per Hellstrom and his unit must be swamped with so many complaints being brought in relation to IT markets.
Substance:
The new complaint apparently focuses on a new function recently introduced by Google (“Search, Plus Your World”) that integrates information (photos, news and comments) from Google’s social network (Google+) within Google’s search results. Those opposing the new function apparently claim that it constitutes anticompetitive tying on the part of Google. This would be intended to reinforce allegations that Google uses its search engine to promote its own services.
According to the Commission’s initial Press Release, the alleged conduct subject to investigation is “unfavourable treatment of [other search service providers’] services in Google’s unpaid and sponsored search results coupled with an alleged preferential placement of Google’s own services” . Following the initiation of the investigation by the Commission there have been various attempts at enlarging its scope.
In the past both Nicolas and myself have been very critical with the allegations against Google (we have no direct/indirect involvement whatsoever in the case and only comment on info that is in the public domain, so we may lack relevant information). For our previous comments on this case, see here, here, here and here; see also here for a guest post by Pablo Ibañez Colomo on this same issue. We understand that the Commission had no choice but to investigate it thoroughly, given that an eventual rejection of the complaints would with all certainty be challenged in Court. Nonetheless, we are concerned that a case against Google would imply either a significant lowering of standards of intervention or the acceptance of the theory of “Karate Competition Law“.
I’m not aware of any evidence pointing out to the fact that Google does or doesn’t discriminate, but let’s move away from the facts, let’s leave aside important issues such as the question of whether Google is dominant and the ease of switching to competing services, and let’s focus on a matter of legal principle: can we require absolute neutrality from a company, even if it is dominant?
The mere term “discrimination” carries extremely negative connotations (if you look at is as “differentiation” it sort of looks a bit more acceptable). It also implies some sense of inherent unfairness. Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between what is unfair and what is questionable under the antitrust rules. Many things in life are unfair, but I can’t complain saying that they’re illegal; or can I?
As we have both written in previous posts, discrimination does only run afoul of the antitrust rules provided that it gives rise to foreclosure (i.e. elimination of competition) (as with most antitrust debates, the best way to find a solution is often to go back to basics). Foreclosure is is the usual standard of intervention and we see no compelling reason for abandoning it in this particular case. Let’s apply this criterion to the reported new complaint: is the fact that information from Google+ will appear in the results enough to eliminate competition from, let’s say, Facebook? It seems like a very long shot.
Given the above, and in light of the limited information at our disposal, we tend not to see any grounds for intervention.
Some suggested readings:
I spent a few hours of the weekend in the train from Brussels to Luxembourg (I would have gone by car, but I never told you that my car got burn by skinheads who felt like burning a trash can right next to my parked car..). The train takes ages, but it allows for some good reading time. The subject of this trip’s readings (aside from an incredibly good novel in Spanish) was precisely search neutrality.The three pieces I read are highly recommendable:
– If Search Neutrality is the Answer; What is the Question? (by G. Manne and J. Wright);
– “Non-Discrimination in Communications and IT Regulation: Understanding the Rise of a Transformative Principle” (forthcoming; can’t say who the author is because the paper is currently undergoing a blind-peer review).
– Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle (by D. Crane).
Ebooks and Resale Price Maintenance

Last week the European Commission announced the opening of formal proceedings to investigate whether international publishers may have engaged in anti-competitive agency agreements regarding the sale of ebooks (see Press Release). Dawn-raids in connection with this case were carried out last March.
Today´s edition of the Financial Times (edited by Pearson -a publisher affected by the investigation-) features a most interesting piece on a very related topic under the title Don´t make Amazon a monopoly.
Its author -John Gapper- argues that competition authorities in the US and the EU should not challenge the arrangements under which publishers set minimum prices for ebooks and preclude companies such as Amazon, Apple or Barnes&Noble from offering discounted prices. It explains that this is a textbook example of the situation that the US Supreme Court had in mind when it overturned Dr. Miles in its Opinion in Leegin, and submits that it would be paradoxical for competition rules to enable free riding-based discounting on the part of Amazon, thus enhancing its alleged “monopoly”.
This situation and the legal controvery surrounding it raises very interesting questions that go beyond the situation at issue and which have the potential to affect online distribution in general.
Does anyone have any strong views on this?
Microsoft/Skype- On how to unconditionally clear a monopoly in Phase I

My “learned” co-blogger (and NY-Times interviewee of the week) initiated a very interesting debate yesterday with regard to the Microsoft/Skype clearance decision. I must confess that I read the decision last evening on the plane back fromFlorence (more on that tomorrow) and, to be frank, I was astonished. Let me briefly, and not exhaustively, explain to you why:
As our usual readers know, I’ve a particular interest in looking at how competition authorities appraise network effects in competition cases (it was the topic of my LL.M dissertation and it’s also supposed to be the topic of a pending PhD project). Since the Microsoft/Skype merger involves two entities benefitting from huge network effects I regarded this decision as a must read.
Well, I was wrong; the decision is a must RE-READ: I had to read certain paragraphs several times in order to make sure that it wasn’t just that I was tired and couldn’t make sense out of it. After several re-reads, I reached the conclusion that, actually, parts of it don’t make any sense.
Nicolas said yesterday that “the decision clearly shows that a merger involving a large monopoly can get Phase I clearance”. I was not involved in this case and therefore I may be missing something but, if you ask me, the decision reads as if the Commission already knew that it wanted to clear the decision in Phase I and then tried to construct an assessment that would fit its pre-determined conclusion. Arguing in a convincing manner that the creation of a “large monopoly” such as the one at issue does not raise competitive concerns and is suitable for Phase I clearance is practically impossible. Nonetheless, that is what the decision has tried to do. And, inevitably, that leads to serious logical problems.
Even from the perspective of an outsider [PS. see note at the end of the post] it’s easy to detect many defects, but for the sake of brevity (notably because I have only allocated one hour of today’s afternoon to write down my notes about this) let’s focus just on one of the Commission’s errors. I have chosen to present you with an error concerning the market for consumer communications because it involves network effects (which is what initially got me interested) and horizontal effects, and because all of us as consumers are able to understand it better. The decision is equally, perhaps even more, questionable with respect to the assessment of vertical and conglomerate effects in the market for enterprise communications, but that part is harder to explain in a brief post; I might develop my views on this in a later post.
In what follows I´ll explain what the decision says in this regards and I will provide you with my very personal views on the Commission´s reasoning. I might be right, but I certainly may as well be wrong. If interested in taking a look at the substantive stuff in other to arrive to your own conclusions, click here:
Random News
Oops, the General Court did it again… Last week in EFIM v. Commission, the Court confirmed the Laurent Piau case-law: a collective dominant position under Article 102 TFEU covers situations of tacit collusion (here labelled, “tacit coordination“) and hinges on proof of (i) detection opportunities; (ii) retaliation mechanisms; and (iii) absence of countervailing power of actual and potential rivals. Interestingly, the Court made no reference to the notions of “collective entity“, “correlation factors” or “economic links“, used in previous cases. A welcome ruling. Yet, much remains to be done in relation to the concept of abuse of collective dominance.
A great hire by Compass Lexecon: Prof. Jonathan Baker just joined them as Senior Consultant. Prof. Baker has been the Chief Economist of the FCC and the FTC. But to me, J. Baker is one of the first economists who articulated a workable theory of unilateral effects in merger cases. For more, see his article with Timothy F. Bresnahan entitled, ” The Gains from Merger or Collusion in ProductDifferentiated Industries”, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 427 (1985) and see link here (and in particular footnote 15).
On 12 December, the Brussels School of Competition will host a half-day conference on the proposed reform of Belgian Competition Law. See here for the programme. My assistant Norman Neyrinck and my friend Laurent de Muyter will speak at the conference. I cannot wait to listen to them.
An unconvenient truth: it is technically wrong to say that the default of a Eurozone State would trigger the end of the € as a currency. On this, journalists tend to oversimplify. Unless all failed States opt out of the Eurozone, the € will stay in business. And by the way, a defaulting State does not necessarily need to exit the Eurozone. True though, defaulting States may be tempted to exit so as to engage into competitive devaluation, and regain growth in the mid-term.
Finally, because I love self promotion, and also for my fan club – Alfonso, pls forward this asap to your colleague – a picture of me with a Chinese official who attended a lecture on EU competition law in Brussels 15 days ago.
Antitrust litigation over the .XXX domain
An interesting piece of news was left out yesterday: an adult website company owner has filed an antitrust lawsuit against the International Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) contending that website owners are “forced to pay excessive fees for .XXX defensive registrations” that may have little or no value.
We suppose you may not be aware of this, but the landrush period for the .xxx domain has been running since 8 November and until 25 November. General availability will commence on 6 December. This means that many companies are right now engaging in defensive registration in order to preserve their image by avoiding third parties from, for instance, registering a web with their brand name under the .XXX domain. As you know, that also happens often with regard to less problematic domains such as .com .net or .org. Why? One example: if you click on www.whitehouse.gov then you´re directed to where you want to go, but check out what happens if you click on www.whitehouse.net .
Antitrust concerns in relation to the ICANN aren´t new. Back in 2003 Professors Frookin and Lemley argued that the ICANN and its policies were contrary to antitrust law (Click here for their interesting paper ICANN and Antitrust).
The full case docket and legal filings are available here.
Some interesting and recent stuff
There has been some interesting stuff going on in the past few days that we haven´t been able to cover. Here’s a brief (and subjective) account of some recent antitrust related news:
– Bill Gates has been (and at the time of writing he may well still be) testifying in a Utah Court in the framework of a case initiated by Novell. Novell is arguing that Microsoft encouraged them to develop WordPerfect software for Windows, only to later withdraw its support because WordPerfect competed with other Microsoft products. Judge Motz, who is presiding over the case, has reportedly expressed skepticism that Novell’s claims have merit.
– Chinese authorities confirmed that there is currently an ongoing investigation concerning a possible abuse of dominance on the part of two State-owned companies (China Telecom Corp. and China Unicom). The antitrust branch within the NDRC is investigating whether these two companies -allegedly dominant in the market for broadband internet services- may have been charging their competitors higher fees for broadband access while offering favorable prices to non-competitors. This is to our knowledge the first high profile abuse of dominance investigation since the Antimonopoly Law was enacted in 2008. The fact that it is targeting two State owned companies makes it particularly interesting. We’ll be asking our “Chinese correspondent” to keep an eye open for any possible developments.
– Here´s one that I´m following with particular interest: NBA players hired the very well known antitrust lawyer David Boies to represent them in their battle against franchise owners that has led to the NBA lockout. The players have now filed two class action lawsuits (one in Minessota and one in California, which are considered to be favorable venues) asking for treble damages (that is, triple the amount of the more than $ 2 billion they would´ve made this season). The lawsuits argue that the lockout “constitutes an illegal group boycott, price-fixing agreement, and/or restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act” an hat the owners´ final offer for a new collective bargaining agreement would have “wiped out the competitive market for most NBA players”. (For our comments on the very similar NFL precedent see here).
– Giorgio Monti (Professor at the European University Institute in Florence and author of one of our favorite competition law textbooks) read our posts on Pierre Fabre and on the future of Article 101 and invited us to participate at a workshop in Fiesole on January 5th. Should be very interesting; we’ll give you more details in the coming days.
– Antitrust students at Berkeley have started their own Berkeley Global Antitrust Blog. Best of lucks to them!
-Finally, last week we received a couple of emails from readers that reveal that my co-blogger Nicolas is apparently becoming a celebrity. One reader told us about the fact that there is a Nicolas Petit street in Luxembourg, and another reader sent us a picture that shows that a young competition lawyer has a picture of Brad Pitt Nicolas above her desk (!)
See pic below for evidence. We´ll keep the identity of Nico´s fan secret in order to avoid any incidents with Ms. Petit ; )
The Italian Way
A message of hope, for our Italian readers.
In Italy, competition experts face promising career prospects:
- Giulanio Amato, once Chairman of the Italian competition authority, twice held the position of Prime Minister – albeit for an ephemeral period;
- Mario Monti, once EU Commissioner for Competition is poised to become the next Italian Prime Minister.
Patent wars (+ Faull&Nikpay)

It has been reported today that the European Commission is concerned about the use that is being made of patents essential to the 3G mobile communications standard in the context of the ongoing legal battles surrounding the smartphone technology markets.
The Commision has confirmed that it has addressed requests for information to both Samsung and Apple, but it has not yet provided any further details. A legal filing by Apple in the U.S. nevertheless reveals that this preliminary investigation on the part of the Commission may be targetting a possible abuse of FRAND (Fair Reasonable And Non Discriminatory) licensing agreements on the part of Samsung, which in the recent past has initiated a large number of proceedings against Apple in several jurisdictions.
This is not the first antitrust investigation regarding anticompetitive behavior related to enforcement, use and misuse of patents undertaken by the EU Commission (think, for instance, about the Qualcomm or Astra Zeneca cases), and it certainly won´t be the last. Patent wars may be a newcomer in the antitrust world, but they´re here to stay.
By the way, I´m very fortunate to be -together with Miguel de la Mano (Deputy Chief Economist at DG Comp and currently Acting Chief Economist at the UK´s Competition Commission), Hans Zenger (CRA), and Renato Nazzini (LMS and Southampton University)- part of the team that is currently should be drafting the chapter on Article 102 for the next edition of the Faull&Nikpay (which, as you know, is one of our favorite books), and given the rise of IP-related abuse of dominance cases we´re planning to devote a specific section to these issues.
Have a nice weekend!
(Image possibly subject to copyright)





