Chillin'Competition

I post hereafter the slides presented at last week’s GCLC lunch talk on the Lisbon Treaty and the Future of Competition Policy. They include presentations by Prof Alan Riley (CULondon) and Eric Morgan de Rivery (JonesDay). A most  interesting event (and my first time presiding a GCLC lunch talk).

Now, a little advertising: contrary to the dominant viewpoint that the fundamentals of competition policy remain stable after Lisbon, I have developped arguments to the effect that the elimination of Article 3(1)g) had the potential to fragilize EU competition policy as a whole. See the paper below (in French) and my recent Antitrust Chronicle paper with Norman Neyrinck, my assistant.

Traité de Lisbonne_Revue Fac de droit

Alan’s position is virtually similar, with  further arguments taken from public international law principles (the Vienna convention) and the recent financial and economic crisis. Please also note that  Alan’s position has been further explored in Chris Townley’s brilliant book on public policy principles under Article 101(3) TFEU.

GCLC – Slides Alan Riley – The Competition Protocol

GCLC – Slides Eric Morgan de Rivery – The Future of Competition Policy – Institutions and Procedure

I am a great fan of Luis Ortiz Blanco. I attach his slides below, see in particular the inspiring Part II entitled “Let’s talk real business“.

Now, a few announcements: Bernard Van de Walle de Ghelcke (Linklaters) is the new President of the GCLC, he replaces Jacques Bourgeois. Tarik Hennen (Stibbe) will serve as the new Executive Secretary. He replaces the author of this blog.

As to me, I have the great honour of becoming the new director of the GCLC 🙂 in replacement of Damien Geradin. I am thrilled. Please note that in this new capacity, I am happy to consider any project/idea/cooperation plan you may wish to submit.

Luis Ortiz Blanco-GCLC Lunch Talk Series-18 March 2010

I attach below the slides presented by Daniel Boeshertz (DG COMP) on the recent enforcement trends in the Commission’s review of airlines mergers.

GCLC – Boeshertz – Recent Trends in the Commission’s Review of Airlines Mergers (26 11 09)

I attach below the slides presented at today’s lunch talk on State Aid and the Financial Crisis.

Thanks to C. Caffarra, C. Ahlborn, D. Piccinin for their stimulating presentations.

According to a speaker at this event, one of the remedies imposed in the Fortis decision implies something close to a Commission-sponsored retail cartel. On the facts, the point may be valid, but is not that straightforward. The remedy is as follows: “Predatory pricing on the retail deposit market is… prohibited“. This, in essence, seeks to preclude the risk that the otherwise failing bank initiates a price war  thanks to tax-payers money, and ends up forcing out healthier firms from the market. On face value, this makes a lot of sense, even though this leads to prohibit under Article 87 EC something that would not be as such prohibited under Article 82 EC, absent dominance.

Now, if I understand correctly, the cartel problem likely originates from the fact that the Commission has also imposed this remedy on other Belgian banks that have benefited from public subsidies (e.g., KBC), as a result of what the remedies might, altogether, have the cumulative effect of chilling competition.

Fire and Brimstone

091005_When in a Hole Stop Digging

Two weeks ago, the GCLC held its 40th Lunch Talk on the review of the rules applicable to vertical agreements. I attach the slides of C. Rakovsky and S. Kinsella.

2009.10.05 – SK slides for GCLC Lunch Talk 18 Sep 09

Review Vertical Restraints – 18 Sept 2009