Chillin'Competition

In going through Damien Neven’s latest paper entitled “Economics at DG COMP” (with M. de La Mano, see link hereafter), it seems now clear that the tough, negative enforcement paradigm that prevailed under Aricle 102 TFEU in the Kroes years is over.

In recent years, the Commission has dumped several cases for lack of convincing evidence. The Qualcomm excessive pricing case and the Velux rebates case  provide good illustrations of this.

In other cases, the Commission has renounced to follow a hard line, and negotiated a settlement with the parties.  Rambus and Microsoft II (Browser) are the main cases here.

The tone of the new Almunia administration is far less agressive, and it seems that the adoption of prohibition decisions is no longer an enforcement priority. Interestingly, and contrary to what was argued by the former senior staff at the Commission, cases like Port of Helsingborg (rejection of complaints re. excessive and discriminatory pricing ) bring almost as much guidance as prohibition decisions.

The only area where I disagree with D. Neven and M. de La Mano’s paper is judicial review. The authors seem to consider that the General Court is ready to undertake serious economic assessments. The thing is, Judge Wahl told us the contrary a month ago at the GCLC annual conference. Plus this may be true in the area of merger control (Ryan Air v. Commission, and before Airtours, Tetra Laval, etc.), but is certainly less obious in other areas (Article 102 TFEU).

Neven & de la Mano 2010