Author Archive
Job promotion
In Belgian academic life, job promotions are rare. In short, tenured academics can move along the following scale:
- Chargé de cours
- Professeur
- Professeur ordinaire
The dream of all academics is to move to grade 3. Means a little more money but more importantly, peer recognition.
Promotions typically happen every two years. Tenured academics can apply for promotion. Applications are reviewed, and ranked by ad hoc committees which scrutinize in particular (i) teaching skills; (ii) research record; and (iii) contribution to University affairs (with a strong emphasis on (ii)).
Yesterday, I moved from 1 to 2. I am now officially a (happy) Professor. This blog, and your visits, have likely contributed to this. Again, thanks for your trust and support.
GCLC Lunch Talk on EU-Korea FTA
Not much to report today.
I attach the slides presented at last week’s GCLC lunch talk. Thanks again to Dirk Van der Wee (EU Commission) and Peter Camesasca (Covington).
Word of warning
Today, the distance between Google and a competition law infringement has drastically narrowed down.
In a formal opinion (not a decision), the French NCA declared that Google occupies a dominant position on the search advertisement market. To tell the truth, this is far from surprising. Yet, this will certainly be bad news for Google, which has been willing to observe a low PR profile until recently.
Now, what’s more interesting is that the French NCA purports in its report to provide ex ante guidelines (“grille de lecture“, §297) on those of Google’s practices which may be deemed abusive under the competition rules. A good illustration of soft, indirect enforcement on the basis of consultative opinions.
Here are the possible abuses according to the French NCA :
- Elevation of barriers to entry on search and search advertisement markets (through content exclusivity, technical barriers, etc.)
- Leveraging of market position on search and search advertisement markets (through ranking manipulation, etc.)
- Unlawful discrimination in relation to the Adwords service
- Unbalanced revenue sharing mechanism in relation to the Adsense service
The French NCA further notes that competition law is the body of rules which should be solicited to allay concerns on those markets. In contrast, sector specific legislation is not needed.
Interestingly, the power of the French NCA to issue such opinions does not fall within the scope of the Commission’s monitoring powers under Regulation 1/2003. In other words, the Commission cannot influence the substantive conclusions of the French NCA under this procedure.
I plan to read the full opinion tomorrow. We’ll be posting on this regularly in the coming weeks.
New paper on ssrn
Here’s a link to a new paper which I just finalized with my good friend David Henry (Howrey). The paper will appear in the book on vertical restraints that I am currently editing with Charles Gheur, as a follow up to our conference last year.
Its main added value is, I believe, to offer a stepwise method to self-assess vertical agreements. Beyond this, the paper offers a few critical perspectives on selected issues. It contends in particular that (i) the double market share threshold is certainly a nice idea on paper, but that it does not pass the practicability test, especially for small firms involved in vertical agreeements; (ii) the new framework marks a clear extension of the scope of EU competition law, in particular because it turns buyer power upside down (from a pro-competitive factor to an anticompetitive one).
Finally, I cannot resist to share a moment of happiness with you. I learned today that Anne Perrot and Jean-François Bellis will use my paper on the effects based approach under Article 102 TFEU as suggested reading for their forthcoming BSC module.
ChillinLeaks
We were the firsts to report on the replacement of N. Calvino and on the whole reshuffling of DG COMP a while ago.
We got a fresh hand on the draft horizontal guidelines, and provided some hints on their contents.
10 days ago, we were the ones to announce that the Commission is attempting to cook a cartel case on the exclusive basis of economic evidence.
Given our proven ability to chill competition on the market for breaking antitrust news, Alfonso and I have decided to formally start a ChillinLeaks column. We simply hope not to be accused of serious criminal offenses in Sweden.
Should you wish to contribute to the free flow of AT-related information, and send us revelations and stories for disclosure on this blog, please note that we apply the highest standard of confidentiality to our sources. You may also reach us by phone, should you prefer this communications means.
To inaugurate this new column, here’s the big news (still unofficial):
Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan) will be the next Chief Economist of DG COMP, and will replace D. Neven who’s supposed to step down shortly. Kühn is a specialist of collusion, collective dominance and hi-tech industries (read Microsoft and interoperability issues). He has consulted, if our information is correct, for CRA International. He holds a Phd in economics from Oxford University. Congrats to him.
Alfonso and Nicolas
(PS: Image possibly subject to copyrights. Source here)
Effet Utile 1 – 0 Procedural Autonomy
This is a big one and, I believe, a satisfactory judgment.
The VEBIC ruling, handed down today by the ECJ (Plenary Session) promotes an extensive interpretation of how far Member States must go to ensure the effet utile of Regulation 1 (although the principle was not quoted). The Court’s ruling might trigger a legislative change in Belgium or simply prompt the review courts to open proceedings to the Belgian competition council (the judgment says “precluding national rules“).
The case concerned the Belgian competition statute. This piece of legislation institutes a Belgian Competition Council as the NCA. Yet, it does not explicitly entrust the Council with the ability to appear before the competent review court when its decisions are challenged.
In the context of national litigation against a decision of the Belgian Competition Council (under national competition rules!), it was argued that the NCAs could possibly rely on Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 to submit ex officio observations before national courts. Yet, some doubts existed as to whether (i) this applied to review courts ; (ii) this was a sufficient mechanism (oral observations must be authorized by the court).
More generally, this triggered a debate on wether the loophole in the Belgian legislation was compatible with Regulation 1/2003, and in particular Articles 2, 15(3) and 35(1). The review court referred four questions to the ECJ.
In its judgment, the ECJ quickly excludes that Articles 2 and 15 enshrine any obligation, let alone prerogative, on the part of the NCA, to participate in review proceedings against its decisions.
In contrast, Article 35 requests MS to appoint effective NCAs (§56). This provision reflects the underlying purpose of Regulation 1, which is to ensure that Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU are applied effectively by NCAs.
The practical uphsot of this is to entrust NCAs with the ability to appear in review courts when their decisions are challenged. Otherwise, “there is a risk that the court before which the proceedings have been brought might be wholly ‘captive’ to the pleas in law and arguments put forward by the undertaking(s) bringing the proceedings” (§58).
Hence, Regulation 1 requires Member States to entitle their NCA to participate to review proceedings (§59). In addition, whilst NCAs are under no obligation to use this prerogative sytematically, “if a NCA consistently fails to enter an appearance in such judicial proceedings, the effectiveness of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU is jeopardised“.
Here’s the full quote:
Article 35 of the Regulation must be interpreted as precluding national rules which do not allow a national competition authority to participate, as a defendant or respondent, in judicial proceedings brought against a decision that the authority itself has taken. It is for the national competition authorities to gauge the extent to which their intervention is necessary and useful having regard to the effective application of EU competition law. However, if the national competition authority consistently fails to enter an appearance in such judicial proceedings, the effectiveness of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU is jeopardised. In the absence of EU rules, the Member States remain competent, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to designate the body or bodies of the national competition authority which may participate, as a defendant or respondent, in proceedings brought before a national court against a decision that the authority itself has taken, while at the same time ensuring that fundamental rights are observed and that EU competition law is fully effective.
Crystal Ball Gazing
I must have been over-optimistic when talking, a few days ago, of “the end of an enforcement paradigm”:
Last week, the Commission
1. opened a formal investigation against Google against what looks like a classic “secondary line injury” abusive discrimination case.
2. raided a bunch of pharma companies, as in the good old days of the Kroes mandate.
Now, Google has already made clear it was willing to cooperate. The case will most likely follow the Article 9 road, which may confirm my point.
Market Definition Teasers
Following Alberto Alemano’s comment a few days ago, I’d like to ask our readers to share possible ” market definition teasers“.
The concept covers funny AND intricate market definition examples. In other words, market definition illustrations which can be used with students approaching the issue for the first time.
Here are mine, centered on products placed on relevant markets with possibly fluctuating borders :
- Coca-Cola & Pepsi & other drinks
- Eurostar & Ferry & Airlines
- Personal computers & Macs
- Branded fragances v. non branded fragances
- iPhones & other mobile phones
- Inux & Windows
- Theatrical movie distribution & DVD rental distribution
- CD-recorded music & digital music files
- Low costs carriers & flag carriers
PS: The picture above is taken from Puggy’s latest album. This LP – which includes a song entitled teaser – is terrific.
Ruminations on Market Definition in Merger Cases
A thought to share:
In going through the RyanAir/AerLingus and Iberia/Vueling/Clickair cases – and following a discussion with David Hull yesterday – I have increased difficulties with the idea that low cost companies and flag carriers operate on the same relevant market.
Intuitively, I am prone to think that the demand served by low costs companies and flag carriers comprises several groups of customers, with different elasticities. In particular, low costs carriers likely face a bunch of captive customers, which would never switch to a flag carrier. In the same vein, flag carriers probably face a share of captive demand, which would never switch to a low cost carrier. I may be wrong out of sufficient technical knowledge, but it seems possible to argue that we have two distinct product markets (which, as the case may be, possibly exercise a competitive constraint on each other). My intuition is further confirmed by the fact that the features of low cost and flag carrier services are very different.
If I find time I’ll try to go through the decisions again, which might conceal the answer to this.
Save the Date – Best Conference ever on Belgian Competition Law
I have just finalized the programme of a major conference on Belgian Competition Law. This conference will take place on 11, 18 and 24 February, respectively in Liege, Charleroi and Brussels.
The purpose of the event is to provide an exhaustive overview of the first years of enforcement under the Belgian competition law passed in 2006.
To benefit from fresh input, I have applied the “below 40” rule. Most of the speakers are young practitioners. Hereafter, an overview of the programme:
- Le droit belge des ententes et de l’abus de position dominante, Damien Gérard (U.C.L.)
- Le droit belge des concentrations, Marc Abenhaïm (Van Bael & Bellis)
- Le droit processuel de la concurrence, Xavier Taton (U.L.B., Linklaters) et Joachim Marchandise (Linklaters)
- L’application du droit belge de la concurrence dans les secteurs libéralisés, Laurent de Muyter (Jones Day et U.Lg.)
- Le point de vue de l’autorité de contrôle, Laura Parret, Présidente de chambre au Conseil de la concurrence
Looks like we are going to have a lot of fun. A book will be given to registered participants on the day of the event. An official programme and a registration form will be posted here shortly.










