Chillin'Competition

These days, competition lawyers and economists spend a considerable amount of time discussing the rise in concentration and profit margins, or the decline of the labour share in the economy. However important, these challenges are not quite as critical as climate change.

It looks like no week passes without at least a new piece of alarming news about global warming and its consequences (just check here from The Guardian alone). The only reason for optimism is that we may be getting so close to the cliff edge that political actors may decide, at long last, to take radical and decisive action.

This year’s Nobel Prize in economics is a sign that things may be changing for the better. William Nordhaus and Paul Romer are two giants that have long deserved the award, but we all know that timing matters, and timing is often not a coincidence. Climate change, in fact, is expressly mentioned in relation to William Nordhaus.

I find myself thinking about climate change pretty much every day. Since competition issues tend to be in the back of my mind quite often too, you will not be surprised to learn that I sometimes reflect on the lessons that the latter can draw from the former.

Is there something that our community can indeed learn from the climate change challenge?

Ideologues will always dismiss expert evidence

Addressing the climate change challenge requires large-scale government intervention and international cooperation. Some conservatives cringe at this idea, which directly contradicts their worldview.

How do they relieve their anxiety and avoid reality? By bashing expert evidence. ‘We do not know whether global warming is actually happening, and even if it is happening we do not know whether it is truly man-made’ is a well-known position.

These same ideologues – a category that happens to include the current POTUS – also love to say that ‘the models used by so-called “experts” are not reliable and simply reflect a political agenda that favours intervention’.

Experts in the competition law community are often bashed in the same way, in particular economists. You are all familiar with these lines too: ‘economists’ models do not reflect reality’; ‘economists are corrupt’; ‘it is a flawed discipline that is fraught with biases’; or, even that ‘it is politics disguised as fancy math’.

Ideologues try to make it all about picking sides

It is not so difficult to read between the lines of ideologues’ mantras and clichés.

The (not so subtle) point is that anyone’s hunch about a given topic is just as valid and relevant as the expert consensus developed incrementally over decades. Since experts have a political agenda or are corrupt (perhaps even both), there is no reason to defer to them. If one’s worldview conflicts with the positions experts happen to advance, such positions can be comfortably ignored.

‘I don’t believe it’ is all one needs to dismiss a report involving 13 agencies and 300 leading scientists.

If expertise does not matter, it all becomes a game of picking the side one prefers. The quest for truth is no longer a worthy cause. What matters is to make noise and to advance one’s agenda.

We observe a similar trend in competition law. Law and expertise are being openly dismissed. Consensus positions, the body of knowledge incrementally refined over the years is seen, by many, as a dispensable and inconvenient obstacle. Such body of knowledge would be ‘out of tune’ with existing realities and demands. Who needs expertise if one can be ‘modern’ and deliver what politicians want?

There will always be opportunists

Some people are aware that climate change is real, is man-made and can have potentially catastrophic consequences, but side with ideologues. Why? For reasons of expediency. In the short-run, it may be profitable to deny climate change, as it may deliver some quick political and/or economic victories. For instance, I am always amazed that some Australian politicians are climate change denialists when their country is particularly vulnerable to the phenomenon and is already suffering its consequences.

There are opportunists in the world of competition law and policy, too. This is natural. Some stakeholders would benefit enormously if consensus positions were ignored, and if enforcement were turned into a discretionalist tool unconstrained by law (and courts).

The more discretionary (and the less legal) competition policy becomes, the faster the burden of proof is reversed, the easier it is for these stakeholders to influence the process and achieve the outcomes they favour. It is not a coincidence that claims that the law is not to be taken seriously, or that it should not be an obstacle to remedy pressing concerns, are frequent these days.

Expertise and law are the way forward

Ideologues and opportunists pose a challenge for the integrity of competition law and policy, in the same way that they pose a challenge for the fight against climate change.

Can something be done about it? I can think of two reasons to be optimistic.

First, a key way forward is to preserve the integrity and trustworthiness of academics, so that expertise is not pre-emptively dismissed by those who feel uncomfortable with it and would rather make it all about politics and picking sides. Fortunately, major steps have been taken in this regard in the competition law and economics community (we will inform about some of these soon on the blog).

The above said, academics should also make a greater effort to explain what we do: the quest for truth is never over, and consensus positions can (and do) always evolve. True researchers are not preachers or activists: they are always open to changing their minds, and to being persuaded by new evidence. Just to mention an example, there are reasons to believe that merger control has been too lenient in the past decades.

Second (and certainly more importantly), one cannot ignore that, at the end of the day, it is for courts to state what the law is. The temptation to see competition policy as a discretionary tool that can be used to save the world may be quite strong. However, competition law (at least EU competition law) is not about fine-tuning markets, but about showing why, in a specific economic and legal context, a given practice amounts to an infringement (or a merger to a significant impediment to effective competition). This analysis is subject to judicial review.

If there is something that my research has taught me, this is that the EU courts are prudent, and that they dislike, above all, arbitrary and unchecked policy-making.

The EU courts have always been particularly suspicious of administrative action that ignores expert consensus. Decisions that go against such consensus are invariably annulled when challenged (think of Airtours and Tetra Laval). Similarly, the EU courts are only willing to depart from the established case law where there are real and powerful reasons to do so, not simply because it is expedient or fashionable.

The Competition Law course founded by Luis Ortiz Blanco (and currently run by Luis himself and Alfonso) is one of the great traditions of our community. The course takes place between January and March in Madrid (at the IEB, literally around the corner from the landmarks you see in the pic above).

This year’s will be the 22nd edition of the course. The programme can be found here. You may also want to check the course’s website (with information about the individual modules and about how to register) here.

What Luis and Alfonso have achieved is truly unique. Top competition lawyers (judges, officials, practitioners, academics) gather every year in what has emerged as a great community.

As you will see in the programme, the course has three components:

• Teaching modules that cover the main aspects of competition law (agreements, unilateral practices, mergers, State aid/public entities as well as the interface between competition law and regulation). I will have the honour to deliver the introductory session, and I will also be coordinating and teaching on the module on the interface competition law and regulation; Alfonso will be running the module on abuses.
• Three half-day seminars bringing together some luminaries in our field. There will be one (coordinated by Eric Gippini Fournier and Fernando Castillo de la Torre) on competition law developments in 2018; a second one (coordinated by Cecilio Madero Villarejo and Nick Banasevic) on competition law and policy in hi-tech markets; and a third one (coordinated by Mercedes Pedraz) on private enforcement.
• Three practical workshops (2h30min each) aimed at familiarising students with the practice of competition law enforcement.

For any practical question, do not hesitate to send an email to competencia@ieb.es. In any case, we will be sharing info on the blog about the half-day seminars in case you want to join us in Madrid!

Yesterday I was invited to take part in a round table discussion by the UK’s Digital Competition Expert Panel. Philip Marsden – a beloved speaker at our Chillin’ events – was there in his capacity as member of the panel, together with Jason Furman and Derek McAuley.

Whenever I discuss digital issues, I tend to emphasise the importance of legal certainty and consistency, and yesterday was not an exception. These are arguably the most important factors in ensuring the best outcomes for competition and innovation.

And bearing their importance in mind is particularly crucial when anxiety – from stakeholders and from politicians – is on the rise. If policy-making is driven by anxiety, it tends to be more volatile – and thus less consistent and less predictable.

These were my musings when I read that the Bundeskartellamt has started an investigation into Amazon’s practices (see here). The press release suggests that there is a significant overlap with the European Commission’s investigation. The central concern appears to relate to Amazon’s dual role as a marketplace and as a competitor to the very merchants that use the marketplace – the famous ‘conflict of interest’.

The Bundeskartellamt’s press release is surprising. Not because it signals that common carrier antitrust is on the rise (remember this post?), but because it appears to be impossible to reconcile with the authority’s position in relation to other matters, in particular online marketplace bans.

Our readers are certainly familiar with the Bundeskartellamt’s position in relation to online marketplace bans. This position has even been made public by the authority in many ways, including in a paper published earlier this year. This paper advances a heterodox and narrow interpretation of the Coty judgment (on this, see here and here). According to the Bundeskartellamt, online marketplace bans are prima facie unlawful outside the specific factual confines of Coty (that is, luxury products).

The policy behind the Bundeskartellamt’s position seems clear: online retailers should have as many opportunities as possible to reach consumers, and these opportunities must include marketplaces.

The economic consequences are also clear: the authority’s strict stance against online marketplace bans amounts to subsidising online marketplaces, in particular Amazon and eBay. No wonder these two firms have been overtly championing the same stance.

With the new investigation comes the obvious question: why would a competition authority subsidise online marketplaces and simultaneously time take action against them?

I, for one, cannot make sense of the two together.

By subsidising online marketplaces, the Bundeskartellamt would be strengthening their position, thereby worsening the very concern raised in the investigation announced this week. One could accept that, potentially, one of the positions advanced by the authority could make sense if considered in isolation. But I do not see how it is possible to make sense of the two together.

I would say more. None of the two concerns raised by the Bundeskartellamt is warranted, and the fact that the two are examined together is evidence of it. If there is something that Coty and similar cases (including those investigated in Germany) reveal, it is that online marketplaces are not in any way indispensable to reach end-users (and certainly not indispensable within the meaning of Bronner/IMS Health).

It is so clear that online marketplaces are not indispensable that many manufacturers, in many industries, take active steps to ensure that their products are not sold through them.

And if online marketplaces are not indispensable, what is exactly the problem with Amazon’s conflict of interest? What would justify imposing common carrier obligations to a service that is not comparable to a telecommunications or an electricity network?

These are the questions that I hope will be discussed explicitly and extensively in the coming months.

In the meantime, I will try to make sense of the factors that may drive the Bundeskartellamt’s behaviour, which amounts to pursuing two mutually contradictory policies. For the time being, I can think of the following explanations:

• Missing the forest for the trees: the Bundeskartellamt’s (commendable) mantra has always been to keep markets open. If, however, the rationale behind certain policies is not acknowledged, and if the inherent trade-offs of intervention are not considered, there is a risk that inconsistent policies are pursued when action aimed at opening markets is taken. These policies may make sense when examined in isolation, but not when one looks at the broader picture.
• Online retailers favoured at everyone else’s expense?: There is a clear set of winners from the Bundeskartellamt’s policy stances: online retailers. These would benefit from guaranteed access to online marketplaces; in addition, online marketplaces would be regulated to their advantage.
  Perhaps the German authority’s implicit goal is to favour this category of operators (some of which will be SMEs). If so, this goal appears to go against the German competition law tradition. German competition law, as I understand it, has always (rightly) sought to protect competition as a process and has always (equally rightly) avoided micro-managing markets and picking winners. In this sense, formulating policy to favour a particular category of stakeholders seems to be against this tradition.
• Two problems are better than none: There is an advantage in pursuing mutually contradictory policies. It keeps an authority busy. As described by Wouter Wils in one of his many great pieces, the desire to show a high level of enforcement activity may sometimes explain the behaviour of officials (and an organisation at large).

We greatly enjoyed yesterday’s conference and wanted to thank you all once again for making it possible, whether you were able to make it there or not.

The feedback we have received so far has been excellent. You can see some of it on our Twitter profile.

The atmosphere was great and confirmed that there are lots of genuinely nice people in our area of practice. Perhaps the legal rankings have a point in having something positive to say about everyone in the business… 😉

If you were not there, you unfortunately missed the memorabilia which, to top last year’s mugs, included Chillin’Competition t-shirts and classical meme calendars. Btw, the image at the beginning of the post was taken by the Commissioner herself and shared on her Twitter account, so it’s ©Vestager.

We will soon post all pictures as well as videos of the brilliant panel discussions and presentations.

In the meantime we simply wanted to say: THANK YOU!

As is customary the day before our conference, we would like to express our gratitude to the conference sponsors. Their support is what enables us to offer this conference for free (and the food, and the drinks, and the gifts…)

A big thank you to all of them!

For several months now every conference and journal in our small world has featured a panel and a few articles on the Intel Judgment, on how to interpret it and on the impact it will have on enforcement and on judicial review going forward. But the most authoritative view has been written by the very Judge in charge of the case.

Judge da Cruz Vilaça was President of Chamber at the Court of Justice of the EU until a few weeks ago, when his term ended. He had also been the first President in the history of the General Court. He is one of the people that has most influenced the course of competition law in recent years, and also (now that he’s not at the Court we can say it) one of the nicest people in the world of EU Law (with a talent for surrounding himself with competent and nice people too). Focusing only on the Intel Judgment doesn’t do justice to his contribution to EU Law and to competition law. But doing justice to that would require much more than a blog post.

Back in August, Judge da Cruz Vilaça published a piece –that has only now come to our attention- titled “The intensity of judicial review in complex economic matters—recent competition law judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU”. It has been published in the Journal of Antitrust Enforcement.

This is a reflection on the role of the Court in competition cases, and in particular on how Intel fits within that case law and on how it is to be understood and interpreted. It does not represent the view of lawyers trying to push things in a given direction or of academics. It is an objective account by the most authoritative person possible. And it engages with academic commentary and is kind enough to cite our blog posts at different points..

We recommend you to read the full piece, but here are just some ideas that stand out:

Intel as an important yet limited step: “the two EU courts have progressively strengthened the conditions of their review and developed a more intense scrutiny in competition cases (…) [the Intel] judgment constitutes an important—albeit limited—step made by the Court in strengthening its judicial control as regards the application of Article 102 TFEU”.

Evolution in the case law: “The way the Court necessarily operates helps to explain why one may sometimes feel that the Court did not always follow an unambiguous line of reasoning in judgments concerning the same field of competition law. It may simply happen that time have not yet come for certain developments (…) But in a fast moving world, judges must also permanently listen to changes in the social, economic, technical, and political environment. How could it be different in the digital age, in a time of globalization and in a knowledge and information-based society?”

On the lessons to be learnt by the Commission: “the regulator would be well advised in the future not to expect any special indulgence for relying on a presumption of any kind of infringement per se of Article 102 TFEU when seeking to prove the anticompetitive character of such a system. Indeed, it would be odd to submit the European Commission to a stricter test when it carries out an analysis of all the circumstances than if it simply had relied on a per se infringement approach!”

Consumer welfare as a useful reference point: “not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition, as a result of which less efficient and less attractive competitors may be forced to leave the market. I believe such statements are useful for clarifying what the Court considers to be the major goal of EU competition rules, which the Commission has articulated as being ‘to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources” As Professor Jones put it, ‘the case-law of the EU courts does not unambiguously endorse’ that view. Rather it sometimes also placed emphasis on the interests of competitors or individual undertakings. I do not think this a serious defect: although perhaps not always 100 per cent consistent, the case-law places in general sufficient emphasis on consumer welfare as a goal”.

Making life harder for rivals is not the same as foreclosure [you will have heard me say this a few times..]: “Of course, the objective (or the result) of the competition process is to make life harder for any operator on the market, forcing it to be more efficient—which in general does not happen with monopolist”.

It is all about correctly allocating the burden of proof: “the ECJ also made it clear that the balancing of favourable and unfavourable effects on competition of the practice in question can be carried out only after the analysis has shown the intrinsic capacity of that practice to foreclose competitors that are at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking. I think this is nothing more than the correct apportionment of the burden of proof between the Commission and the defendant. The specificity of a system of rebates that includes an exclusivity clause is that once the Commission has discharged its duty to establish the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct, the hurdles will be particularly high for the latter when trying to rebut the Commission’s finding”

(…)

“the dividing line between margin of appreciation and duty to review is sometimes very thin, which makes it more difficult to maintain the consistency of the case-law in all circumstances. Courts, however, have an arsenal of legal weapons available to them in this challenge. The most obvious are the rules on the burden of proof. A fine example of how to use them is given in paragraphs 66 and 67 of the judgment of the General Court in Intel”.

[By the way, that last bit makes exactly the same point as that made by General Court Vice-President in the abstract of an article to be published soon in JECLAP. He also says that, following Cartes Bancaires and Intel, the key to striking the right balance between the Commission’s margin of discretion and the Court’s in-depth review “can be found in the burden of proof that rests upon the Commission pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003”. We couldn’t agree more]

***

The article contains much food for thought. And, incidentally, as frequent readers of the blog will have already noticed, it confirms the understanding of the case that we had been positing here and elsewhere for a while..

The excessively generous eulogy that Pablo wrote a few days ago, together with my inactivity on the blog over the past few months weeks, have led some to suspect of my demise.

The absurd number of extremely kind messages that I’ve received over the past few days even made me doubt it…  But I’m happy to confirm that reports in this regard have been greatly exaggerated:

After a few months locked in the office for different and very good reasons (piece of advice: don’t try to combine that with the additional sleep deprivation linked to having a 4 month old baby!), I’m now starting to see the light again  and hope to be back blogging regularly very soon.

In the meanwhile, and beyond work, we have made some conference outings to start regaining the habit:

• On 11 October I was in Helsinki for a great conference organized by Ilkka Leppihalme. Director General Laitenberger, Richard Whish, Jorge Padilla and John Rattlif were the other speakers. Richard and John used some slides to accompany their excellent presentations and kindly gave green light for us to post them on the blog (thanks!). Here they are:

Richard Whish- Recent Cases on Vertical Agreements and Excessive Pricing

Kilpailuoikeus 2018 – EC Competition Cases before the European Courts – John Ratliff

I won’t share my slides for now because I might use them again in the future and they’ll lose the surprise factor 😉 But here is a teaser.

• On 24 October I participated at another very good conference put together by Lexxion’s CoRe, the VUB and CCIA on “Competition Policy in Online Markets”. A video with the highlights of the event is available here. While we are not (yet) subject to must-carry remedies, here is a succinct recap of the event published in a “competing” blog;
• And today I spoke on the impact of the Intel Judgment at this LeadershIP conference in Brussels. There was much to discuss and little time, but my main message was one of optimism (and I think realism) and trust regarding EU Courts, who are often the target of what I think is (mostly) unwarranted criticism. Will leave the details for a separate post;
• My efforts to catch up with Pablo re conference appearances were doomed, as he has been not only taking care of the blog but also actively travelling around (see here).

Future events

Looking to the future now, there are several must-attend events coming up:

-First of all, we are very excited to be hosting the 4^th Chillin’Competition Conference next Tuesday (20 November). With the help of some overbooking we will try to release some additional seats for those in the waitlist. If you did not get a ticket (apologies), we will try to make sure you are well informed of what goes on. If you registered but cannot make it, please let us know so that we can get someone else in.

-The very day after, on 21 November, there will be an interesting debate on procedural issues in Luxembourg (“Due Process in Competition Law Enforcement: A Comparative Perspective”). More info is available here. I won’t be able to attend, but if any of you can and is willing to report on it, please drop us a line.

-On 26 November I will be speaking at the AEDC’s annual conference (that is the Spanish Association for the Defence of Competition) in Madrid. The programme is here: Programa Jornada Anual AEDC 2018.  The conference is sold out but will be streamed live.

-On 17 January Commissioner Vestager will be hosting her conference “Shaping Competition Policy in the Era of Digitalisation”. Registrations are now open and here is all the relevant info (again, stay tuned, because we hear additional speakers may be announced soon…)

There is not a single legal test in EU competition law.

Some practices are deemed prima facie lawful, and other practices prima facie unlawful irrespective of their effects. In between, there is conduct subject to a (standard) analysis of effects. As I explained recently on the blog, there is yet another category of practices; these are subject to an ‘enhanced effects’ analysis. By ‘enhanced’ I mean that it is necessary to provide, at the very least, evidence of indispensability before intervening.

I like to think of the applicable legal tests in EU competition law as discrete points along a spectrum.

This is what the spectrum looks like under Article 102 TFEU:

It makes sense to zoom into the right end of the spectrum, which is a bit crowded. It looks like this:

This is what the spectrum looks like under Article 101 TFEU (ATP stands for ‘absolute territorial protection’ in case you are wondering):

One question that keeps me busy (and which I discussed, inter alia, in Ithaca and Vilnius) is why and how the Court of Justice chooses the applicable legal test in individual cases. Why is some behaviour deemed prima facie lawful? Why is the enhanced effects analysis chosen for some practices but not for others?

The question is important, and the answer not immediately obvious. For instance, leveraging conduct is not subject to a single legal test under Article 102 TFEU. ‘Leveraging abuse’ is not a legal test. These words do not say anything about the conditions under which a given practice is deemed abusive.

In some instances (e.g. tying), leveraging is prima facie unlawful irrespective of its effects. In other instances (e.g. refusal to deal), it is subject to an enhanced effects analysis. What explains the disparate treatment of the various leveraging strategies?

I found the question interesting for other reasons. For instance, the Court has been criticised for applying different legal tests to refusals to deal, on the one hand, and ‘margin squeeze’ practices, on the other. The latter are subject to a standard effects analysis whereas the enhanced effects analysis applies to refusals to deal. Could it be that the Court has a point in spite of the criticisms? Spoiler alert: I believe it might.

***

Why are some practices prima facie unlawful under both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU?

The case law suggests that a practice is deemed prima facie unlawful irrespective of its effects – i.e. it is a by object infringement – where:

• It is presumed to serve no purpose other than the restriction of competition; and
• It is presumed to be capable of having restrictive effects on competition.

Intel (in the context of Article 102 TFEU) and Murphy (in the context of Article 101 TFEU) make it clear that firms can always provide evidence to rebut the presumption of capability.

Why are some practices prima facie lawful? I can identify two instances in this sense:

• Where the practice is objectively necessary to attain a pro-competitive aim (think of Metro I, Coty, Pronuptia and so on as clear examples); or
• Where the effects would not be attributable to the practice. For instance, the effects of above-cost price cuts are not attributable to the dominant firm, but to rivals’ inefficiency.

And finally: why is it that sometimes the Court of Justice has required an enhanced effects analysis? And why, for instance, is the enhanced effects analysis required in refusal to deal but not in ‘margin squeeze’ cases?

It all has to do, I believe, with the remedy. One needs to turn the analysis on its head and start by figuring out what intervention might entail in practice.

The standard effects analysis applies where the remedy is reactive in nature – a one-off obligation not to do something. These are instances in which a cease and desist order can effectively deal with the issue (no monitoring, no complexity with the implementation and/or with compliance).

The enhanced effects analysis applies where the remedy is proactive – that is, where it amounts, directly or indirectly, to imposing positive obligations on firms (a requirement to do something). These are instances in which the remedy comes with all sorts of potential difficulties (related either to the design, the implementation or the monitoring of the obligations).

The Microsoft I case (and, more precisely, the obligation to supply interoperability information on FRAND terms) is a good example of proactive enforcement. Determining the fair price of interoperability information is incredibly complex. So much so, in fact, that the Commission left it for the firm to figure out.

Against this background, one can understand why the Court may have deemed it justified to differentiate the legal treatment of refusals to deal and ‘margin squeeze’ practices.

A ‘margin squeeze’ can be effectively addressed through reactive intervention. Dealing with an abusive refusal to deal, on the other hand, is much more complex. One has to determine (directly or indirectly) a wholesale price, and then monitor compliance with the remedies on a lasting basis.

In cases like Commercial Solvents, Magill or IMS Health, the Court may have felt that the complexity of the remedy justified raising the substantive bar. The remedy, accordingly, is not an afterthought, but a key question that informs substantive analysis.

Ordering a company to resume supplies with a rival, to start licensing its intellectual property or to change the design of its products (as in the Internet Explorer case) can go wrong for several reasons – this is where I generally crack my joke about Richard Whish being probably the only person with a version of Windows without the Media Player.

If this is true (which it is), it makes sense to confine to exceptional circumstances the instances in which these remedies may apply.

I would say more: looking at the remedy to identify the appropriate legal test is a much more meaningful exercise than all other attempts to distinguish between categories of practices.

Instead of using more or less artificial labels and discussing whether one label is more appropriate than another, it makes sense to look at what remedial action may involve in practice, and infer the legal test from this exercise.

As ever, I look forward to your thoughts!

The news is out there: Alfonso has been promoted to equity partner, and he will be able to introduce himself as one on 1 January 2019.

I could say that the promotion is deserved several times over (which it is). But it would not really capture how I feel about it. That needs a few more words.

I met Alfonso when he was a 23-year old LLM student. In my mind he was a partner already back then.

Let me be clear: it is not that Alfonso ‘had the potential’ in his early 20s. All the qualities of the best law firm partners were already there, in full bloom, ready to be put to the best use. He could very well have acted as a partner at the time (as I suspect he might occasionally have done and know for sure he has in the past few years).

What I admire in top practising lawyers is that they have to be good across the board – unlike academics, who, so long as they are solid researchers, can afford to be walking failures in pretty much every other aspect.

Alfonso has acquired such fabulous reputation in record time because he is not just skilled in many disparate areas (technical, analytical, managerial and so on); he excels at every single one of them, which is quite unique.

And I mean this in the best possible sense. For instance, it is said that practising lawyers need to be ‘good with people’, which is often taken as code for ‘good at networking’. Alfonso is much more than that. He is good with people in the sense that he is generous, genuinely cares about others, and people like him a lot (in part, but not only, because he is great fun to have around).

I am sure many of our younger readers look up to Alfonso. They should. In fact, I cannot think of a better role model.

I have no doubt you will find the way to join me in congratulating him for this milestone!

Autumn is here with us (as the pic above attests), and conference season, which is never over, appears to be picking up speed as days get shorter.

Many would never have told, but I took the picture last Saturday in central Vilnius. I was there – my first time ever in Lithuania – for a lecture at the competition authority. It was really enjoyable. I am grateful to Gintarė Surblytė-Namavičienė and Šarūnas Keserauskas for being such amazing hosts. I already look forward to coming back.

UCL | White & Case Brussels: Autumn Competition Law Conference (7 November)

On 7 November I will be in Brussels (a place that I have visited before) for the first Autumn Conference jointly organised by University College London and White & Case Brussels. The programme of this great initiative, which features yours truly on innovation (alongside much more prestigious specialists), is available here.

IMPORTANT: Makis Komninos and Ioannis Lianos, joint organisers of the conference, are kind enough to allow up to 15 of Chillin’Competition readers for free. When booking a ticket via this website, use this promotional code: lse-ibanez-colomo. Thank again, Ioannis and Makis!

TILEC 15th Anniversary Conference: Legal and Economic Challenges in Competition Policy (9 November)

A couple of days later, I will have the honour to be one of the speakers at the conference celebrating the 15 years of the Tilburg Law and Economics Center. I have always admired TILEC and have followed closely its many achievements over the years.

If you are interested in the programme and/or in signing up for it (I believe there are still a few spots available), please see the programme here.