Live Coverage of Conference on Fines (Fourth Panel)
We move on with a last panel on the relationship between EU and National enforcement in relation to sanctions.
Christophe Lemaire (Paris I and Ashurst) gave a comprehensive presentation on the process of convergence in terms of sanctions and, more generally, on procedural and institutional settings in the EU. And the list is impressive, as Member States seem to informally or through the ECN be working on how to streamline their approaches to sanctions. A working group related to sanctions was apparently created a short while ago in the ECN, but the timeline for the deliverables remains uncertain.
Eddy de Smijter (DG COMP, EU Commission) talks of the interplay between public and private enforcement. Eddy made the funny remark that it is currently “sales period” at the Commission, with rebates for leniency, for settlements, etc. Some want additional presents, such as reductions for compliance programmes and for voluntary compensation. But a key concern is that this is likely to reduce the gap between the n°1 and n°2 leniency applicants, and this is no option for the Commission. Moreover, if the Commission is ever to extend such rebates, this is likely to further decrease fines for everyone, on grounds of non discrimination. Then Eddy mentions in passing the theoretical debate, that exists in the US, that compensation could be a condition for leniency. He then moves to the question of what can be adjusted in leniency programmes to promote compensation. The idea of a “civil mirror” looks attractive to would be applicants: you get immunity at the administrative stage, you get it in the context of civil litigation for damages; you get fines reductions at the administrative stage, you get similar reductions in terms of damages at a later stage. Or another option is to state in the law that leniency applicants are to be the last resort defendants in claims for damages. A third option is that if you go after the immunity recipient in civil damages, then the immunity applicant should not be jointly and severably liable for the damages with the other cartel participants.
Eric Morgan de Rivery covers the Menarini case. His presentation speaks for itself. There should be, after Menarini and KME-Chalkor, full review. But he doubts the EU Courts are willing to move beyond words on this, and he argues that if the Court state that full review is actually discharged, a close examination of the facts reveals that it is not.
Christophe Lemaire – Interplay between EU and National Enforcement [Mode de compatibilité]
Eddy de Smitjer – Impact of the public-private interplay on fines [Mode de compatibilité]
Eric Morgan de Rivery – Commission’s Fining Policy and the ECHR [Mode de compatibilité]
Live Coverage of Conference on Fines (Third Panel)
A nice lunch, and we are back on track.
We start with Cédric Argenton‘s (TILEC) presentation. Cédric seeks to identify a system of penalties that achieves optimal deterrence considering that firms are akin to black boxes, in other words that the management board has little control over what managers actually do. But they can design compensation schemes that seek to incentivize managers ex ante. With this background, Argenton and Van Damme build an economic model that tries to assess how individual managers will behave, considering that they know that the management board has imperfect information over what they actually do. They explain that manager have three options: do nothing, achieve high profits by cutting costs, achieve high profits with collusion. The conclusions they reach in their paper are that individual sanctions are a very good way to increase the optimality of the current sanctioning mix. They are actually a “help” to firms that attempt to comply with the law. But individual sanctions should not come alone. They should also be accompanied by corporate sanctions. Cédric and Eric’s economic model is currently undergoing experimental testing at Tilburg university. Looking forward to read their empirical results.
The following speaker is Stefan Thomas (Tubingen University). His speech is essentially about the “single economic entity” doctrine. According to Stefan, this doctrine is in plain contradiction with the principle of personal liability, as protected by several constitutional rules and international instruments. The German supreme court actually recognized this. Moreover, this doctrine is also injurious of another fundamental principle, i.e. “nulla poena sine culpa“. Stefan also takes a shot at the inconsistency of not entitling the companies to rebutt the parental liability presumption, simply by showing that they have not known or that they have not participated to the infringement. Stefan says that the Commission should assess if the parent firm has done everything possible to avoid infringement. If this is the case, this should exculpate it from liability, or mitigate it, under the competition rules.
The third speaker is Anny Tubbs (Unilever). To her, no one is perfect and a fortiori, no company is perfect. Agencies should recognize this rather than using sabre-rattling words to talk of competition infringements. Anny then goes on to explain what she views as necessary components of an effective compliance programme. In this context, I advise the reading of the slides, where there is a nice one on the 5 Cs of a good compliance programme. She also explains the internal hurddles within companies to establish competition compliance programmes. Competition law is not the sole area of law where compliance matters. Money laudering, corruption, personal data, etc. are all areas where compliance is critical. In house lawyers from the same company, but representing distinct disciplines thus often compete to convince management to allocate compliance resources towards them. Anny also indicates that lawyers are often their worst ennemies when it comes to compliance, because when they talk to salesmen, they use words that are so complex that no one ever wants to listen to them. This makes it important for in house lawyers involved in compliance to develop clear and simple messages at the attention of businesses.
A recurring issue in the presentations was the parental liability doctrine.
Very fortunately, a Commission official who was sitting in the room accepted to make some remarks (in personal capacity).He first vindicated that compliance programmes are, at any rate, a good thing, and that there is no need for additional discounts because those programmes (i) diminish the risk of infringement in the first place; and (ii) decrease the duration of infringements with efficient self reporting mechanisms.
He also gave some thoughts on parental liability, being supportive of AG Kokott’s opinion in the Gosselin case. To him, parental liability is not a problem, because the mother company, even if it is very remote from the subsidiary, derives some profit from the cartel at any rate. In reaction to this, S. Thomas counter-argued that we had spent decades to build fundamental principles such as “nulla poena sine culpa“. Those are great progresses of the rule of law. They should not been thrown away, simply for the sake of designing an optimal sanctioning programme.
This led me to a puzzling analogy: to me the Gosselin’s Kokott doctrine is akin to sanctioning with criminal fines the heirs of criminals, simply because they have given birth to a delinquant, and that they may have profited from it through presents and other gifts. Unless those persons are actual accomplices (they have instructed or assisted to illicit activities), there should be no ground to blame them.
Cedric Argenton – Optimal Deterrence of Collusion in the Presence of Agency Problems within Firms
Anny Tubbs – Compliance Programmes Codes of Conduct and Social Responsibility
Live Coverage of Conference on Fines (First Panel)
Judge Ginsburg ( United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) opens this session. In his view, the main flaw of current deterrence policy is to only seek to make cartels unprofitable for companies. But as long that it is not unprofitable for individuals to craft cartels, there will be cartels. What must be understood is that individuals profit from price fixing in ways different from corporations. The fact that individuals are compensated for divisional profits, regardless of firm’s performance when faced with cartel proceedings is for instance one of the things that keeps cartels creeping the economy. Moreover, there are many ways sanctions on individuals are mitigated by firms, thereby nullifying their potential deterrence (compensation schemes, etc.). Judge Ginsburg mentions for instance that some Korean firms re-hired businessmen involved in cartels, after jailtime in the US, and had taken care of family, etc.
His bottom line is that to do nothing against individuals involved in cartels makes no sense. Individual fines (monetary) are not a necessarily a good deterrent because they find a limitation in individual’s wealth. Jail sentences are probably the most deterrent penalty. Debarment is possibly a good thing, but it has no teeth against persons at the end of their career. It can also be wasteful to take away this human capital from society (but the same is true with jail). The focus of attention should thus be, in his view (i) on individuals (in particular on compensation scheme); and (ii) on what is the most efficient mix of sanctions. Finally, judge Ginsburg draws an analogy between firms and a whipping boy. Leave it to you to understand the parallel.
Andreas Stephan (East Anglia) opens with a note of disagreement with Judge Ginsburg, but promises to come back to this. He moves on explaining that the current “fines-only” approach of agencies is not the right one. Fines are not deterrent, plain and simple. And the debate on how to improve fines is dead in the water, given it is proven that optimal fining would lead most firms to bankrupcy.
Andreas’ second concern has to do with the protracted nature of antitrust investigation. All too often, this gives rise to the odd situation where the victims of corporate fines are the current shareholders, employees and consumers (through fines being passed on) of a company, whilst employees responsible of cartels are often no longer in business, and immune from any penalty. Andreas also makes an interesting point on economic studies that show that share valuation decreases when investigation are announced, but increase when investigation are closed with an infringement decision. According to him, this means that capital markets worry more about uncertainty than about sanction.
Andreas also points out that most supporters of criminal sanctions cite the US as an example of an efficient system. But what people ignore is that most such cases in the US are settled and not brought to an end. In fact, if the US have been so successful at running criminal antitrust cases, it is because they have a system of plea bargaining. We dont have any such thing in the EU, and if we had, it may not pass the bar before the ECHR.
Finally, Andreas mentions Director Disqualification Orders, which although in existence in UK law have never been enforced. And one of the problems with the UK regime, is that it only applies to Directors, and to Directors registered in the UK. Now, with the EU internal market, this can be easily circumvented, with UK firms appointing Directors in Belgium or elsewhere. Andreas concludes on the Commission’s reluctance to even initiate discussion on individual criminal sanctions. But this evolution is already taking place in the MS. In his view, the Commission should use the ECN to start this dialogue.
Tom Barnett‘s (Covington and Burling) speech’s is about differences between US and EU antitrust enforcement. He explains generally that what agencies try to do is to bring change in business culture. He talks about the growing awareness that cartel participation is risky. The main difference with the US, however, is that this evolution has taken place earlier there. In the EU, the evolution of business culture has been way slower. In the remaining of his speech, Tom focuses on more specific points. On compliance programmes, he recalls the audience that enforcers face the problem of separating wheat from chaff, i.e. what is a genuine compliance effort from a sham compliance policy. That said, Tom finds a genuine merit in compliance programmes (even sham ones it seems), which is to help educating business to antitrust risk. Rewarding them with some discounts on fines many thus not necessarily be a bad idea. His other important point is that the timing sanctions are imposed is important. Sanctions are adopted more quickly in the US than in the EU. In his view, it is important to speed up the fining process. First because, the closer to the facts the penalty, the more certain its deterrent effect. Second, because corporations need to move on and return to business quickly.
The final speaking slot goes to our good friend Luis Ortiz Blanco. Luis draws an analogy between antitrust fines and Rubens’ massacre of the innocent. This point, which ties in with Andreas’ Stephan presentation, is that the current fining policy harms many innocents, i.e. current employees and shareholders, whilst leaving managers unscathed. In turn, his presentation explores alternative ways to deter competition infringements. Luis makes a good point on The ECtHR in Menarini. The EU judicial review system may well pass the Menarini standard. But should we aim for a bare pass, or should we aim for the best possible, Nobel prize winning, system of judicial review. This point will be further elaborated in a forthcoming paper with Mark English. Luis then goes on to elaborate on a possible asymetrical administrative procedure in competition cases, with several types of proceedings available in distinct types of cases. His presentation, which was both hilarious and creative, is available below.
Andreas Stephan – Should Individual Sanctions be Part of Deterrence Efforts [Mode de compatibilité]
Ortiz Blanco – Ways in Which the System of Sanctions can be changed
Live Coverage of Conference on Fines (Introduction Session)
As a kid, I had a dream. That of becoming a professional journalist. And I must say that this blog has, at least to some extent, entitled me to achieve it.
Today, the TILEC-LCII conference on fines offers me an additional opportunity to beat M-Lex do this. I’ll try to offer live coverage of the discussion, as we go through the day. For each session, the speakers’ ppt. presentations will be available at the end of the post. A disclaimer: please bear with the rough, instant reporting style of my posts.
So here we go. We start with Damien Geradin‘s introductory speech. A take away point: the usual argument against new sanctioning tools, is that it is not feasible under current EU competition law standards. Now Damien is very right to mention that competition law underwent many significant reforms in the past decade, including vertical restraints, decentralisation and the effects based approach in Article 102 TFEU.
We then have the presentation of André Uhlman, from ThyssenKrupp AG. André points out the difficult conundrum between the non recognition of in-house legal priviledge, and the increased role of self assessments in EU competition law. This leads companies to avoid documenting internal advice, for fear of subsequent disclosure, and involve external counsels in all aspects of business life. A second area where companies walk on thin ice is sanctions against employees. On the one hand, shareholders, the executive board and the public opinion may promote a zero tolerance policy, yet on the other hand, this will undermine employees incentives to cooperate in the context of investigations, or to report information useful in the context of leniency applications, for fear of being subsequently sanctioned. A third point is that compliance is expensive, in particular in times of crisis. So if NCA were to reward compliance efforts – like the OFT or the French NCA do – this could help convince to set up such programmes. Finally, André mentions a case that we should have covered on this blog, i.e. C-199/11, or the Commission’s private enforcement test case, where the Court held that the Charter did not prevent the Commission to act as a damages claimant and enforcer in one and a same case. Frankly, to me, the value of this case seems fairly limited, given the few instances in which the Commission (or a NCA) will be victim and enforcer at the same time, unless NCAs or the Commission are ever empowered to act on behalf of claimants in follow on litigation.
Prof J. Harrington‘s talk (Wharton) walks us through the economics of anticartel enforcement. He starts with the dynamic incentive approach of deterrence. I like the idea that when cartels grow and endure, some documentary evidence is lost and this should be accounted in the deterrence equation. According to Prof Harrrington, the penalty inflicted should increase as time passes, to reflect for the lost evidence. Now, Prof. Harrington explains that in fact, fines that make cartels unprofitable (the current approach) may be higher than what is needed to make cartels unstable (the dynamic approach I just mentioned). And he seems to propose to muscle up the second approach. That said, to me, the first approach remain a necessary policy. Making cartels unstable is not enough because it does not eliminate the harm that existing cartels cause until they are destabilized.
Prof Harrington turns to the thought provoking question: “how can we be concerned with overdeterrence if all collusion is bad?“. Well, he goes on to explaining that competitive conduct can be wrongly accused of hardcore collusion because of flaws in the discovery and prosecution process. He takes, for instance, the example of the erroneous prosecution of R&D JVs, trade associations, etc. This concern may, however, be close to moot in the US, given the current sophistication of the law. Yet, in the EU – and this is my own view here – the problem may be more acute, for instance with the cartel-like prohibition of certain types of information exchanges. The other over-deterrence concern mentioned by Prof Harrington is that firms may invest excessively into compliance efforts, which can be potentially wasteful from a social perspective.
Prof. Harrington’s next point is about the methodological problems of measuring over or under-deterrence. For instance, studies that seek to assess the cartel overcharge are based of samples of discovered cartels only. There is thus a bias in the data.
Harrington also talks of companies compliance efforts. He says there can be doubts that all those efforts are serious. And he points out to some puzzling examples. Recently, BA promoted to its board a business executive that had been previously charged with price fixing allegations. More generally, agencies should seek to better understand what a firm’s true commitment to compliance is. Compliance declarations may after all be just cheap talk.
Harrington also alludes to screening mechanisms for cartel cases. Unlike what certain enforcers seem to believe, those tools are his view are complementary and not substitutes to leniency programmes. Leniency applicants primarily come forward for fear of being detected. Because screening programmes increase the risk of ex officio detection, they also increase the efficiency of leniency programmes.
Finally, Harrington touches upon individual penalties. If individual penalties are introduced, cartel trust busters will face a wealth of new incentives instruments – individual leniency being one of them – in their hunt against cartels. Harrington believes that races for individual leniency would be a powerful tool to detect cartels.
Here are the presentations.
Christoph Klahold – Importance and Challenges of AT Compliance for Large Corporations
Joe Harrington – Optimal Deterrence of Competition Law Infringements
On the road again
Yesterday again, I found myself pondering: how did I get so busy?
Sure, my lawyer friends would find my schedule laughable. And a bunch of them have actually told me they envy my freedom, and the time I spend abroad.
Yet, all the commuting my activities involve is beyond reason. Take a look:
- Monday: Paris, Brussels, Liege, Brussels (roughly 600 kms)
- Tuesday: Brussels, Lille, Brussels (approx. 300 kms)
- Wednesday: Brussels, Liege, Brussels (approx. 220 kms)
- Thursday: Brussels, Luxemburg, Brussels (approx. 420 kms)
- Today: Brussels, Liege, Brussels (approx. 220 kms)
All this by car, of course, meaning that I have (i) spent a fortune in oil; (ii) significantly harmed the environment; and (iii) been away from my computer for long hours (this is the excuse for the low posting frequency lately).
Sandwiched into those insane hours on the road, I have had to teach for 15 hours, to deal with a raft of organisational issues (we have a conference on antitrust fines on Monday), and to prepare a talk on the June Microsoft compliance case (I attach the presentation at the end of this post).
The bottom-line: some days I happen to dream about a teaching position in Brussels.
Présentation – Microsoft Compliance Case – EIPA Annual Conference
Groundhog day, self-restraint, and shooting one’s own foot
I’ll give you a sneak peek into how the editorial process of this blog works:
I frankly wasn’t planning on posting anything on the blog for the rest of the rather busy week. But then I attended a conference, and an idea spurred to mind: why not write a post on how a few -not all-competition conferences (topics and speakers) are starting to make us feel inside a time loop, sort of like in the Groundhog day movie…
Maybe not, I thought later; perhaps some of the usual suspects frequent speakers in the conference market wouldn’t like it (there are categories among these: (i) those who never refuse invitations out of politeness -which I find laudable- and who are also tired of speaking always about the same stuff, however convenient; and (ii) those who pay for speaking slots -which I understand less- and who wouldn’t appreciate the comment). Moreover, we had also bragged about how we would do something different announced our own conference and have not yet arranged it, so it’s probably wise not to write on this. So, as you see, I’m not. 😉
But now Gianni de Stefano (from Latham and antitrustitalia) sends us a GCR piece titled: “Spain fines antitrust complainant” joking that we should write about it. And he’s right, we could not let this pass by without a post…
You see, I don’t want to write too much Spain-related stuff, and so a few days ago I resisted the temptation of writing anything about prioritization and allocation of resources when the CNC sanctioned 5 distributors of Magic cards with 7,000 euros (one party received a 148 euro fine, another a 748 euro fine; the highest fine was 3,424 euros). I won’t comment on this either (as if it was necessary…). But this silence exhausted my self-restraint capacity.
So let’s focus on yesterday’s news. What happened is the following: the association of canned fish producers [yes, those responsible for the death of the sole responsible of Spain’s victory in the 2010 World Cup: Octopus Paul –evidence of the murder available here-] lodged a complaint against mussels producers alleging that the latter had entered into price-fixing agreements. The CNC sanctioned mussels producers with 1.7 million. So far so good (except for mussels producers). The fact of the matter is that within the framework of the investigation the CNC discovered that the complainants had themselves decided to react to the cartel by agreeing on a collective boycott. And now the complainants have received a 2.1 million fine. Once again, no comment. [Query: could you complain about a cartel and ask for leniency regarding another reprisal cartel?]

Actually, there’s one comment. If the accusations are true there is nothing to object to the CNC’s decision. But I have been involved in a few other cases where the complainants were also the instigators of the agreements complained of, but they weren’t sanctioned. Curiously enough, in all of these cases the complainants were not companies, but individuals, labor unions or public bodies. There is probably a reason for this: sanctioning companies has the political advantage that when they get pi.. crossed they don’t do this…
P.S. The food sector has given us so much food for jokes thought that the European Commission’s statement that there are no particular competition problems (after having set up a task force, drafted this report, and done all this) was a surprise to us.
Ménage à trois (part III; Makis Komninos): Case T-169/08 PPC v Commission
This third part of our inaugural ménage à trois discussion on the Greek lignite Judgment features (see part I and part II ) another good friend of this blog: Assimakis Komninos. Makis is a great guy, a partner at White & Case, and was a successful co-counsel in the case we’re they are discussing, so he was an obvious candidate for our triad of guests. As you will see, Makis sides with Marixenia Davilla in praising the Judgment. In doing so, he replies to José Luis Buendía’s more critical views.
To illustrate Makis’ post we have chosen the image of another famous lignite-related (look at gift in the middle) ménage à trois. 🙂

First of all, it is such a great pleasure to be invited to comment on the Greek lignites case. I should disclose at the outset that I represented, as co-counsel, the Hellenic Republic in its intervention in support of PPC during the written proceedings stage.
My personal view is that the General Court did the right thing and annulled a decision that was going a step too far. There is no doubt also, in my view, that the Commission was using this as a kind of “test case” against a carefully selected target.
The intellectual starting point is, I think, the very nature of Article 106 TFEU. This is a rather curious provision and I certainly agree with José Luis that it is essentially about State measures, but the sure thing is that the Treaty fathers wanted to give it a carefully circumscribed scope. A systematic interpretation of the Treaty does not support that there is general prohibition of all State measures that may – even indirectly – impact on competition and business activities. Article 106 TFEU restricts the behaviour of Member States only by reference to the scope of some other Treaty provisions, such as Article 102 TFEU. This is the provision that the Commission chose to rely on by reference.
Then, if one reads the Commission’s decision, one fails to see how Article 102 TFEU would come into play here, albeit by reference. Would the theory of harm refer to a leveraging abuse, to a refusal to supply, to a failure to satisfy demand (exploitation), to discriminatory treatment on the part of PPC? Not clear at all. The Commission thought that it did not have to specify this. By the way, I am not suggesting that in Article 106 TFEU cases, the Commission need to show anti-competitive effects etc. This is not what I argue. Instead, I submit that the Commission should be able to demonstrate with a sufficient degree of intellectual clarity that the State measures are connected with a specific kind of actual or potential abusive behaviour by the undertaking in question. This is all the Court says and I fully agree with Marixenia.
With respect, I do not agree that the previous case law gave the Commission leeway in not being obliged to identify a specific kind of actual or potential abusive behaviour. On the contrary, if we look at RTT and even Connect Austria, while we see references to “equality of opportunity” and to RTT’s “obvious advantage over its competitors”, that by no means leads to the conclusion that the mere existence of inequality of opportunity is sufficient for an Article 106 TFEU violation. In both cases, the Court spoke about specific anti-competitive phenomena. In Connect Austria, the problem was that the undertaking in question was allowed (through the inequality of opportunity) to expand its dominant position onto a related market and, in RTT, the Court is very clear and explicit as to the kind of abuse of dominance that was at stake: “an abuse within the meaning of Article [102] is committed where, without any objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market reserves to itself an ancillary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities on a neighbouring but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking”.
In the PPC case, the Commission seemed to build its case on the grounds that PPC’s lignite rights are not sufficiently counter-balanced by significant deposits of its competitors, even though lignite is not an essential input to compete downstream. I am actually being kind to the Commission, when I say this, because this theory is not clearly articulated within the txt of the decision. The Commission then identified a remedy: PPC’s competitors needed to gain access to 40% of the total exploitable lignite reserves. In a nutshell, the Commission was seeking to use competition law to unbundle the Greek electricity generation market. However, this instrumentalisation of the law, in order to redesign a market structure, lacked both a legal and a sound economic basis. Moreover, it would lead to a dangerous precedent by permitting the Commission to attack market structures it dislikes by invoking the vague concept of “inequality of opportunity”.
The Commission misinterpreted the case law and its decision deserved to be annulled. I do not think this is the end of Commission enforcement under Article 106 TFEU, as some commentators have argued. It will only have to do a better job next time and articulate also a clear theory of harm that refers to an actual or potential abuse of dominance by a public undertaking or an undertaking with special or exclusive rights, as a result of certain State measures.
Ménage à trois (part II; José Luis Buendía): Case T-169/08 PPC v Commission (… and Jules v Jim)
For this second part of our first ménage à trois discussion we are proud to present you with José Luis Buendía’s view of the Greek Lignite Judgment in response to Marixenia Davilla’s earlier post. Aside from being the head of Garrigues’ Brussels office -where I happen to work-, José Luis is widely regarded as “Mr Article 106”. He also masters the art of illustrating all hiw views with metaphores and parables. Continue reading and you’ll see what we mean….
[For a contrarian view of José Luis’ arguments check our Makis Komninos post (which we will publish here tomorrow)].

It is a real pleasure to be invited to contribute to this blog. This is even more the case given the topic, the format, and the identity of my nice and learned counterparts – Marixenia and Assimakis. Even if I don’t share their enthusiasm about this judgment, it is clear that they have done an excellent job as lawyers. So, congratulations to them and to their colleagues who worked om the case.
Contrary to them, despite having been in the past an EC official, I have not had any involvement in this particular case. I am nevertheless very interested in it, since I am working on a new edition of my book on Article 106. Moreover as I have explained in a recent article, unfortunately there are not so many Article 106 cases to comment. So I am glad to have this opportunity.
This case made me think of François Truffaut’s film Jules et Jim about a genuine ménage à trois. The Catherine of the movie (Jeanne Moureau) had – simultaneously – a husband and a lover. As Marixenia rightly implies in her interesting comment, Article 106 also has simultaneous links with State aid on the one hand and with antitrust on the other hand. In my view the problem with the judgment is to assume that Article 106 is only married with antitrust and faithful to it. It is not. Article 106 is about State measures and is therefore essentially different from antitrust.
It is for this reason that, in my opinion, this judgment is not really consistent with the previous case law that it claims to be following. Indeed, previous judgments, like RTT, considered that the mere granting of an exclusive right to a public undertaking previously enjoying a dominant position was in itself contrary to Article 106 combined with Article 102 TFEU. This conclusion was based on the effects of the State measure creating the extension of a dominant position from one market to another one (effects that were similar to those of an abuse). The said conclusion did not require any actual abusive behavior.
In today’s judgment the General Court reads the previous case law in a different manner and finds that it does require the existence of an abusive behavior, at least a potential one. Since the EC decision did allegedly not established the abuse but relied only on the effects, it was according to the Court in breach of the Treaty. This reasoning seems to me clearly contradictory with the case law.
This reasoning seems also a little bit abstract. Indeed, the judgment itself concedes that the mere possibility of a future potential abuse would have been enough to satisfy the legal test. However, since according with the judgment, the decision did not explore this issue in an explicit manner, it had to annul it. It seems however obvious to me that a State measure extending the dominant position from one market to a neighbor one has, at the very least, the potential to lead to abusive behaviors. So, the Court seems to say that it is only the lack of an explicit reference to this obvious consequence that leads to the annulment.
I assume that the Commission may appeal the judgment before the Court of Justice in order to clarify the application of Article 106 with regard to special or exclusive rights. I also think that in the future the Commission should be more active and more coherent in the application of this provision.
In any event, I also know that my Greek friends would have a view different from mine, so I really look forward to the continuation of the debate.
Antitrust Figure of the Day
Heard through the grapevine. At a recent conference, someone close to the General Court mentioned that the average total cost of a judgment would be in the ballpark of €240,000 (!). Don’t know how this figure was calculated, but this ain’t cheap justice to me.
I remind our readers that the average duration of competition proceedings before the Court is 50 months.
Ménage à trois: The General Court’s judgment in Case T-169/08 PPC v Commission

A few posts ago we decided to follow the Commission’s example and launched a reform aimed at working less. Our plan is to do so by opening this blog to comments on recent Judgments on the part of three experts: one writes a “standard post” on the Judgment, and two others comment on it. As anticipated, our first ménage à trois deals with the Greek Lignite case (concerning the inteface between Arts. 106 and 102 TFUE). Our three inaugural guests are three good friends of this blog: two of them (Marixenia Davilla -Shearman&Sterling- and Makis Komninos -White&Case- and were actually involved in the case (on the winning side) and the third (José Luis Buendía -Garrigues-) is the author of the bible on Article 106 (of which a new edition is on the pipeline). Marixenia has written an excellent post to get the ball rolling. Comments will follow soon. Enjoy!
***
First things first…Many thanks to Chillin’ Competition for ambushing giving me the opportunity to participate in my first ever platonic ménage a trois. This is so exciting that I am contemplating making an addendum to my curriculum. I am certain it will boost my chances of being promoted before I turn 50.
Let’s move on to the juicy stuff now, namely, the PPC judgment rendered by the General Court on 20 September 2012. Having worked on this case whilst at Howrey (RIP), I am particularly pleased to see PPC winning a very difficult battle.
This case concerns Article 106 TFEU, a provision that cannot be implemented on its own, but must be combined with another EU law provision, in this case Article 102 TFEU. Article 106 can also be described as a sort of transgender hybrid enforcement tool, existing in limbo somewhere between antitrust and state aid law, without really being any of the two. Commission decisions under Articles 106/102 are addressed to member states, but are not state aid decisions. They make findings regarding actual or potential abuse of dominance, yet the level of analysis required in such cases to prove an infringement is notably lower compared to that required for establishing a “pure” abuse of dominance under Article 102. Pursuant to Article 106(1)/102 case law, the Commission is not required to show that the company in question abused its dominance, but that it can be led to committing an abuse merely by exercising the state measure in question. In other words, Article 106 is not a bird, is not a plane, but does (still) fly, and has been a pretty handy weapon for the Commission, particularly in cases concerning network industries.
But the fun does not end there. The case law developed in relation to Articles 106(1)/102 predominantly comprises preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice, which are neither consistent with each other, nor that easy to categorise. That said, a broad categorisation is possible, and in PPC’s case the Commission relied upon the so-called “inequality of opportunity” case law (Raso and Others, France v Commission, GB-Inno-BM, and Connect Austria). According to the Commission, based on that case law, there is no need to identify a specific type of abuse; suffice to show that the state measure in question leads to an inequality of opportunity between market operators. Haha, piece of cake! Prove that, dear Commission official, and you’re done, you can close the shop and go on holiday!
This interpretation is somewhat unsatisfactory. In its appeal against the contested decision of March 2008 PPC invited the General Court to clarify this issue, and the latter bravely took on that challenge.






