Incomplete Price Discrimination
Global Competition Review (also known as GCR) knows how to design very nice competition law conference programmes (see the 2010 Dominance and Unilateral Conduct conference here). However, it seems less efficient when it comes to the pricing of those events, at least from an industrial economics perspective.
The above picture illustrates GCR’s system of price discrimination. What puzzles me is that through this system, GCR leaves aside a significant share of clients (me and my students academics, students, etc.) who might be interested to attend the conference, and ready to compensate for GCR’s costs. GCR could thus probably expand output, whithout incurring any loss… A little odd isn’t it?
Chillin'Competition 
[…] I am going to change it any time soon for the 3rd edition of 2009. The bottom-line: not unlike some conference organizers, publishers should price discriminate and establish specific prices for university researchers and […]
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