Chillin'Competition

Are Leniency Programs Efficient Detection Instruments? – A Practical Assessment – Romain Douny

Leniency programs are mushrooming. The present dissertation seeks to ascertain, from both a critical and an empirical standpoint, whether those programs are – as alleged by many competition authorities – efficient detection tools to detect competition law infringements. To this end, this dissertation first reviews the leniency programs adopted in the main competition jurisdictions of the EU.  It seeks, in particular, to highlight the upsides and downsides of the various leniency models. This dissertation then provides some empirical data (statistics) on the record of leniency programs: number of leniency applications lodged and outcomes. This analysis will help determine whether certain regulatory features of leniency programs have an empirical impact on their effectiveness. It will also helps us determine whether member states should harmonize their leniency programs and, if so, on which model. Finally, this dissertation concludes in offering critical, philosophical, and prospective reflections leniency program.