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Archive for October 31st, 2012

Case T-111/08, Mastercard. A priceless Art. 101(3) assessment

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A while ago we wrote a post on The Slow Death of Article 101(3) TFEU, where we said that in recent European Commission, practice, only once the challenged agreeement was not deemed to be a restriction by “object”, and that only in that case the Commission had carried out a serious Article 101(3) assessment. This was the Mastercard Interchange fees case, and last May the General Court rendered its Judgment on it (btw, we have no interest whatsoever on this case).

Over time we have realized that the longer and more serious a post is, the less you guys read it (and this one will be quite lenghty). So, of the many complex and interesting issues raised by this case, we will only comment on a general point regarding the Court’s assessment of the interchange fee arrangements under Art. 101(3). Given that almost no Decision or Judgment delves into 101(3) analyses these days, the General Court’s assessment is priceless for anyone interested in exploring how this key provision is to be interpreted. In this sense,  it’s surprising that the Judgment hasn’t received more attention.

I confess that I undertook the reading of the Judgment with a clear confirmation bias: I was looking for evidence that would support my point that it’s incredibly difficult to successfully argue that a given agreement can benefit from the legal exemption provided by 101(3). To my (positive) surprise, I found out that despite applying the “manifest error of assessment” standard of review, the General Court actually did carry out an assessment of the evidence put forward by Mastercard which is well more detailed than what I expected (see paragraphs 207-237). Right or wrong, it was acceptably thorough, specific, and even revealed that the Court had managed to understand the so-called Baxter model put forward by the applicants.

The Court’s application of the first condition of Article 101(3) nonetheless raises some interesting and debatable issues that relate to the fundamentals of Art.101(3), which are partly discussed below. I take responsibility for the opinions below, but I have taken a free ride benefitted from educative discussions with two of my favorite legal minds: Luis Ortiz (who has authored the best study on how Art. 101(3) is to be applied) and Eric Gippini (whose great Friday Slot interview is available here) (to make sure, they don’t necessarily agree with the views developed below)

Click here if you’re interested in reading more (spoiler alter: dense stuff ahead)

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Written by Alfonso Lamadrid

31 October 2012 at 3:51 pm

Posted in Case-Law