Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category
Antitrust Quote of the Day
Neelie Kroes’s trademark has long been her tough public statements. I was not a great fan of that.
Now, while the master of DG COMP, she said something quite right about economic analysis: “[e]conometrics, for example, are a useful servant, but a terrible master.”
Here’s the source of the quote.
Slides – Course on EU competition law – Summer Program FUSL
Hereafter, I attach the slides I used yesterday for a lecture in the context of a summer program in EU and International Business Law.
I gave the lecture with D. Hull (Covington). Good fun. Next time, I’ll organize my party on a Friday, so that I feel even fresher the next Monday.
Thanks again to Prof. Strowel who invited me to give this lecture.
I understand that those materials may be of limited interest to our readers, who are all eminent experts of competition law. Yet the presentation contains a number of good pics.
Old Wine, New Bottles
In their 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the US agencies have poured old wine in new bottles.
The section on coordinated effects adds a theory of harm to standard tacit collusion analysis. It is entitled “parallel accomodating conduct“, and consists in:
“situations in which each rival’s response to competitive moves made by others is individually rational, and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce prices or offer customers better terms. Coordinated interaction includes conduct not otherwise condemned by the antitrust laws” (see p.24).
My reaction: this looks familiar, and similar, to unilateral effects scenarios arising in oligopolies as a result of product/location differenciation or in cases of price leadership.
But aren’t those theories of harm already caught under merger control rules?
Moreover, shouldn’t unilateral and coordinated effects scenarios be mutually exclusive on a given relevant market? This also seems to be the view of DG COMP’s former chief economist.
The alternative explanation: an attempt of the US agencies to discretely relax the heavy evidentiary constraints required for a finding of coordinated effects?
PS: it is now summer time in Europe. Our friends keep harassing us with end afternoon drinks proposals at Brussels’ terrasses. For social reasons, Alfonso and I have thus decided to limit our posting pace to three stories a week in July. BTW, I heard through the grapevine that the Hogan Lovells party was huge (in very many respects…).
We want you!
Chillin’Competition currently has between 2,500 and 3,000 weekly readers.
However, “only” 100 of you are subscribed to the blog, and “only”142 of you have joined our LinkedIn group.
It is really useful for us to have some info on who the readers of the blog are, since it enables us to better target our posts. Subscriptors are immediately notified of new posts and their identity (or rather their email address) is only known by us. The LinkedIn group gives us the same info and also enables you to know who other readers are (in fact, the group is so far fulfilling its mission since it has proved useful in fostering some interaction amonsgt you).
So, a message to those who have not yet subscribed/joined the group: We want you!
Job Opportunities
Let’s put headhunters out of jobs :).
I heard on the grapevine that Covington and Burling Brussels is facing a huge stream of new business.
The downside is that current partners and associates are working ’round the clock. Since I have good friends, co-authors and university colleagues there, I am a little concerned.
Now, Covington and Burling is hiring junior and senior associates. I suppose you can send your application to one of the partners working on competition cases.
Antitrust Quotes of the Day
On the alleged non-structural views of Chicago scholars => “An industry which does not have a competitive structure will not have competitive behavior” (George J. Stigler, “The Case Against Big Business,” Fortune, May 1952)
On the 2004 Microsoft case => “The Commission’s case was like a jellyfish – shapeless and very painful” (I. Forrester). Thanks to I. Debois for the pointer.
Unknown Truths about a Famous Antitrust Father
I just read a short and interesting piece by W. Kolasky on the life of one of the most anonymous antitrust celebrities: John Sherman. A few things worth keeping in mind:
1. John Sherman’s name has been used by the British army to name Medium Tanks M4. In the British army, it is conventional to name American-built tanks after famous Civil War generals. Whilst John Sherman was a politician, his brother, William Tecumseh Sherman was one of the most famous Union Generals during the civil war.
2. The Sherman Act originates in a bid to protect tariff regulations that promoted domestic US industrial interests (!). In the late XIXth century, the democrats alleged that protective tariffs had caused the spread of domestic trusts. Sherman, a Republican and a fierce defender of tariff legislation, sought to rebuff the link between the rise of trusts and tariffs. Eventually, to reduce pressure to abolish tariff legislation, the republicans were left with no other choice but to promote anti-trust legislation (p.86).
3. Following years of fierce parliamentary debate (p.87), the final version of the Act was expunged of most of the wording initially proposed by Sherman, and replaced by the text that we know (p.87). The disappointed J. Sherman later commented that this change in wording would deprive the bill of all effectiveness. He is quoted to have said that the bill would be “totally ineffective in dealing with combinations and Trusts. All corporations can ride through it or over it without fear of punishment or detection.” (p.88)
PS: Some law firms, like WilmerHale, follow an open-access publication policy. Most papers written by their lawyers are publicly available on their website. Nice.
Draft Op-Ed on Inflation and Competition Policy in Belgium
It took me part of the day to draft the attached text (in French).
Comments are very welcome. The thing should go to press shortly.
Carte blanche – Indexation automatique Inflation et Concurrence – N Petit
38th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy- A virtual seat for Chillin’Competition readers
The 38th edition of the Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy directed by Barry Hawk at Fordham Competition Law Institute will take place in New York on Wednesday, September 7 and Thursday, September 8, 2011. As usual, the conference will feature la crème de la crème in international antitrust (see here for this edition´s truly impressive programme).
As long-time admirers of this conference and avid readers of its published annual proceedings, Nicolas and I are very glad to offer our readers what we see as a unique chance to contribute to the discussions that will take place there this year. Here’s how:
Amonsgt other most interesting panels, on this upcoming edition there will be a roundtable on “European Competition Enforcement”. The line-up of panelists for the roundtable on this topic is certainly unmatchable: Alexander Italianer (Director General, European Commission); Bruno Laserre (President of the French Conseil de la Concurrence); John Fingleton ( Chief Executive at the UK´s Office of Fair Trading), Andreas Mundt (President of the Bundeskartellamt) and Manuel Sebastiao (President of the Portuguese Autoridade da Concorrencia). The task of chairing a bunch of chairmans will fall upon the shoulders of the competition lawyer I´ve always looked up to Luis Ortiz Blanco.
I will be assisting Luis in the drafting of his written contribution, and while dicussing about it an idea sprang to mind. Given the surprising and rising number of competition law experts from all over the world who read this blog, we thought it could be very interesting to ask you to share your ideas on issues related to European Competiton Enforcement that you think should be dealt with by the speakers taking part in this roundtable. We proposed it to Barry Hawk and he also thought it could be interesting, so that’s what we’re doing now.
If you wish to directly contribute to this top-level discussion with your thoughts or experiences on issues related to European competition enforcement, please send them to us preferably as comments to this post. Please note that all of your suggestions will be seriously considered as potential issues to be thrown to the panel, but also that we cannot guarantee that all of them will make it there.
Thanks go to Barry Hawk and Luis Ortiz Blanco for this opportunity. We look forward to hearing about your ideas!
Antitrust Syllogism of the Day
Combine: “… negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion” (Supreme Court Justice A. Scalia, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law O¢ ces of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 2004)
with: “Collusion of firms can take many forms, of which the most comprehensive is outright merger” (G. J. Stigler, “Theory of Oligopoly”, (1964) 72 Journal of Political Economy, 44)
and get → “the supreme, most comprehensive, evil of antitrust is outright merger“
Or a good antitrust illusltration of the limits of legal syllogism.
Chillin'Competition 